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ABSTRACT. President Obama took executive actions to address climate change that far ex-
ceeded previous Presidents' efforts to pursue policy objectives through presidential administra-
tion. This Note does not focus on the Obama Administration's major climate change regulations
and international agreements, which have already attracted much attention. Rather, this Note
identifies a concerted but inconspicuous effort to embed climate-consciousness throughout the
executive branch, elevating climate change as a key decisional criterion for federal departments
and agencies. This Note explains how the Obama Administration's efforts exhibited a delicate
interplay with the judicial and legislative branches, responding to a judicial demand for rigorous
administrative reasoning about climate change while sidestepping congressional hostility to cli-
mate change action by finding a narrow zone of congressional inattention. Although convention-
al wisdom counsels that subsequent Presidents may easily reverse policies advanced through
presidential administration, the Obama Administration's efforts to advance climate-
consciousness may prove surprisingly durable due to formal legal constraints, bureaucratic iner-
tia, and public backlash.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early years of his Administration, President Obama placed little em-
phasis on climate change,' and his first term was marked by three high-profile
environmental policy failures. The first occurred at the 2009 United Nations
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. There, parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the primary vehicle for interna-
tional cooperation on climate change, negotiated over the parameters for a new
global climate change treaty. The fractious Copenhagen negotiations were
marred by public disagreements between major powers, particularly between
the United States and the "G-77+China" coalition of developing nations.2 On
the last day of talks, President Obama flew to Copenhagen to participate in
last-minute negotiations that salvaged a widely panned and weak' three-page
agreement.'
The second failure was the Waxman-Markey bill, which would have estab-
lished a national cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases with stringent
1. Environmental activists and academic observers have argued that during President Obama's
first term, climate change took a back seat to other efforts, including economic recovery. See
Marianne Lavelle, 2016: Obama's Climate Legacy Marked by Triumphs and Lost Opportunities,
INSIDE CLIMATE NEws (Dec. 26, 2016), http://insideclimatenews.org/news/23122ol6
/obama-climate-change-legacy-trump-policies [http://perma.cc/J2CK-HMFR] (quoting
high-profile environmental activists and academic observers).
This is, of course, a controvertible view; even during the economic recovery, the
Obama Administration brought a pro-climate focus to spending. According to the Office of
Management and Budget, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 contained
$26.1 billion in climate change-related spending. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
11-317, CLIMATE CHANGE: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED To CLARIFY NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND
BETTER ALIGN THEM WITH FEDERAL FUNDING DECISIONS 8 (2011).
2. Juliet Eilperin, In Copenhagen, U.S. Pushes for Emissions Cuts from China, Developing Nations,
WASH. POST (Dec. io, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2009/12/09/AR2oo912o904 5 96.html [http://perma.cc/RR5M-2HCQ]; see also Int'l Inst.
for Sustainable Dev., Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December
2009, 12 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. 1 (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf
/enbl2459e.pdf [http://perma.cc/BUC4-97HC] (providing a summary of the Copenhagen
negotiations).
3. John Vidal et al., Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure, GUARDIAN (Dec.
18, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/20o9/dec/18/copenhagen-deal
[http://perma.cc/JQG5-4HN5]; Bryan Walsh, In Copenhagen, a Last-Minute Deal that Satis-
fies Few, TIME (Dec. 18, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article
/0,28804,1929071-1929070_1948974,oo.html [http://perma.cc/WR26-USEB].
4. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its
Fifteenth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/20o 9 /11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010).
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emissions reduction targets.' Even after a two-decade hiatus in major domestic
environmental legislation following the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 6 the
Waxman-Markey bill and its Senate counterpart nevertheless attracted strong
support from most Democrats and some Republican lawmakers.7 Yet both the
House and Senate versions of the cap-and-trade legislation were gradually wa-
tered down by concessions to heavily emitting industries.' Although the Wax-
man-Markey bill passed the House, then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid
declined to introduce cap-and-trade legislation in the Senate, knowing that he
could not reach cloture.9 After the Waxman-Markey bill died, environmental
advocates faulted President Obama for the Administration's disengagement
from the legislative effort.o
The third failure was the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of
Mexico, a deadly offshore wellhead blowout that led to the largest marine oil
spill in history." Although BP, Halliburton, and Transocean were found liable
for the spill,12 the Deepwater Horizon accident also exposed serious deficien-
cies in the risk regulation regime for offshore oil drilling" and reinforced cli-
mate change advocates' calls to transition away from fossil fuels.14
5. Comparison Chart of Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, http://WWw.c2es.org/federal/congress/in/comparison-waxman-markey-kerry
-lieberman [http://perma.cc/961KQ-5J2Y].
6. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9-11
(2014); see also Daniel C. Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century Environmental
Regulation to 21st Century Sustainability, 47 ENVTL. L. 1, 7-9 (2017) (arguing that this hiatus is
indicative of a deeper "political rupture" along partisan and ideological lines).
7. Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2010/10/11/as-the-world-bums [http://perma.cc/H2JJ-PF641.
8. Darren Samuelsohn, Waxman Predicts Committee Passage as Details Emerge on Cap-and-Trade,
Energy Bill, E&E DAILY (May 13, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2oo9/o5/13/full
[http://perma.cc/KCJU6-AHCS].
9. Bryan Walsh, Why the Climate Bill Died, TIME (July 26, 2010), http://science.time.com/2010
/07/26/why-the-climate-bill-died [http://perma.cc/5HRX-H53S].
10. See Randy Rieland, The Blame Obama Game, GRIST (July 27, 2010), http://grist.org/article
/2010-07-26-the-blame-obama-game [http://perma.cc/H2DR-R2SQ].
ii. Deepwater Horizon -BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/enforcement/deepwater-horizon-bp-gulf-mexico-oil-spill [http://perma.cc
/3XBH-TXYG].
12. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010,
21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 757 (E.D. La. 2014).
13. See generally Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, NAT'L
COMMISSION ON BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING (Jan. 2011),
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo2978/DEEPWATER-ReporttothePresidentFINAL
.pdf [http://perma.cc/5KCK-Y36F] (detailing deficiencies in the risk regulatory regime).
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These three setbacks impelled the Obama Administration to overhaul its
climate change efforts. However, after Republicans made sweeping congres-
sional gains in the 2010 midterm elections, legislative gridlock forced the
Obama Administration to respond to climate change with executive actions."
Signaling that the Obama Administration prioritized climate change, White
House officials recruited John Podesta 6 -a veteran policy and political strate-
gist and then-chairman of the Center for American Progress-to serve as the
President's "climate and energy czar."" In 2013, the White House unveiled the
President's Climate Action Plan, which identified climate change regulations, in-
ternational agreements, and federal support for state and local responses to
These regulatory gaps spurred deep reforms, including the establishment of a new
regulatory agency, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. Regulatory Reforms, BuREAu
OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., http://www.boem.gov/Regulatory-Reform [http://perma.cc
/GG9L-SC9Y].
14. See, e.g., Bill McKibben, Mr. President, Lead Now on Fossil Fuels, L.A. TiMEs (June 6, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2olo/jun/o6/opinion/la-oe-mckibben-global-warming
-201oo606 [http://perma.cc/KU65-HWAF].
15. Amanda Reilly & Kevin Bogardus, 7 Years Later, Failed Waxman-Markey Bill Still Makes
Waves, E&E NEws (July 27, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/o6oo39422 [http://
perma.cc/WS9T-NY'V].
16. The Obama Administration's appointment of Podesta reflected a recent trend of appointing
high-powered "czars" in the executive branch with cross-agency policy portfolios of specific
substantive issues. See Tuan Samahon, The Czar's Place in Presidential Administration, and
What the Excepting Clause Teaches Us About Delegation, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 169, 170 (noting
that czars increasingly tend to be capable experts with extensive government experience, and
observing that czars increasingly take on responsibilities that overlap with those of cabinet
officials); see also Aaron J. Saiger, Obama's "Czars"for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White
House Staff 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2011) (examining the Obama Administration's use of
czars).
17. George Russell, Pacific Pushback: Podesta, White House Warned About Ocean Preserve Expan-
sion To Combat "Climate Change," Fox NEws (Sept. lo, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com
/world/2014/09/10/pacific-pushback-podesta-white-house-warned-about-ocean-preserve
-expansion-to.html [http://perma.cc/FT4A-8RCE]. Podesta was brought in specifically
after the Obama Administration identified a need to pivot to executive action to bypass an
uncooperative Congress. Ben Geman, The Audacity of John Podesta, ATLANTIC (Nov. 21,
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2o14/11/the-audacity-of-john-podesta
/446901 [http://perma.cc/G5PT-6HP2]; see also The Power of the President: Recommendations
To Advance Progressive Change, CTR. FOR AM. PROGREss 6-7 (Nov. 2010),
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/201o/11/pdf/executive
-orders.pdf [http://perma.cc/M9CC-3EMN] (detailing the ways in which the Center for
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climate change as the three "pillars" of executive climate change action." The
"first pillar" consisted of regulations to limit greenhouse gas emissions from a
wide array of sources. The "centerpiece" of this pillar was the Clean Power
Plan, a Clean Air Act regulation that limited greenhouse gas emissions from
power plants." In implementing the "second pillar," international agreements,
the Obama Administration sought a rapprochement with the Chinese govern-
ment on climate change. President Hu Jintao's retirement and the Chinese
Communist Party's selection of President Xi Jinping as his replacement provid-
ed an opening to improve U.S.-Sino relations. The United States and China's
cooperation on climate change developed quickly following a June 2013 summit
between Presidents Obama and Xi,20 and subsequent negotiations led to bilat-
eral agreements that facilitated the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement by
resolving disagreements between the world's two largest and most influential
economies. For the "third pillar," the Obama Administration worked with local
and state leaders to support their climate change responses by providing re-
sources and technical support.2 1
This Note identifies a less visible fourth pillar of the Obama Administra-
tion's strategy: a set of policies that advanced climate-consciousness in the ex-
ecutive branch. "Climate-consciousness" refers to the acceptance of climate
change as a key decisional criterion in administrative decision making. The
fourth pillar aggressively used President Obama's powers of presidential ad-
ministration- his authority to direct the federal bureaucracy to advance his
policy agenda- to embed climate change as a key decisional criterion in admin-
istrative decision making. The Obama Administration exerted this authority
with a wide range of tools ranging from well-known methods like regulatory
review at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to more obscure
methods like budget planning. Through these efforts, the Obama Administra-
tion sought to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the federal government,
improve the federal government's resilience to climate-induced disruptions,
18. The President's Climate Action Plan, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT 5 (June 2013), http://www
.whitehouse. gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf [http://perma
.cc/62ZS-B2GL].
ig. Coral Davenport, Donald Trump Could Put Climate Change on Course for "Danger Zone," N.Y.
TiMES (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/11/11/us/politics/donald-trump
-climate-change.html [http://perma.cc/D6KH-SD2X]. Challenges to the regulation have
been stayed pending reconsideration by the EPA. See Order, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-
1363 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 8, 2017) (per curiam).
20. Julie Hirschfeld Davis et al., Obama on Climate Change: The Trends Are "Terrifing," N.Y.
TIMEs (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/o9/o8/us/politics/obama-climate
-change.html [http://perma.cc/K5QP-W2LZ].
21. See ThePresident's Climate Action Plan, supra note 18, at 6-7.
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and equip departments and agencies to grapple with the uncertain consequenc-
es of future climate change.
This Note's investigation of the fourth pillar reveals that the Obama Ad-
ministration championed climate-consciousness with tools that were deeply re-
liant on sound scientific, technical, and economic information. In other words,
the Obama Administration sought to accomplish its objectives in a manner that
enhanced bureaucratic rationality. This focus on reasoned administration re-
sponded to a judicial demand for scientifically rigorous government responses
to climate change, while sidestepping congressional hostility to climate change
action by finding a narrow zone of relative congressional inattention.
Additionally, President Obama exercised his powers of presidential admin-
istration in a manner that was at odds with conventional expectations about
presidential administration. First, the fourth pillar balanced control with coop-
tation by combining top-down directives and incentives with bottom-up im-
plementation. This belied the common caricature that presidential administra-
tion is a coercive and hierarchal use of presidential power. Second, the fourth
pillar had a mixed record on transparency. President Obama and senior admin-
istration officials appeared to selectively draw attention to the fourth pillar,
sometimes choosing to insulate the fourth pillar from scrutiny. This belied the
common expectation that presidential administration is transparency-
enhancing. Third, Congress was ill-equipped to engage with the fourth pillar,
as the fourth pillar often sought to influence the internal functions of depart-
ments and agencies. Finally, from the perspective of transitions in presidential
power, the fourth pillar may be surprisingly well-positioned to weather the
Trump Administration's deregulatory efforts, challenging the conventional nar-
rative that purely executive actions are especially vulnerable to reversal by sub-
sequent Presidents.
Part I of this Note briefly surveys the literature on presidential administra-
tion and introduces the concept of climate-consciousness. The Part then de-
scribes the fourth pillar and its constituent mechanisms. The Part closes with
an analysis of the commonalities, divergences, and complementary relation-
ships among those policies. Part II explains how recent judicial precedents
prompted, reinforced, and complemented the Obama Administration's ap-
proach to presidential administration. Part III explores how the fourth pillar
largely left Congress out of the picture, as the interventions used to promote
climate-consciousness were particularly unamenable to congressional opposi-
tion. Part IV offers a prospective view, explaining why climate-consciousness in
the federal government may remain durable throughout the Administration of
176
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President Trump, a climate change denier.2 2 The Conclusion briefly looks into
the tension between the Obama Administration's efforts-which represent
presidential administration at its zenith - and democratic legitimacy.
I. PRESIDENT OBAMA'S FOURTH PILLAR OF CLIMATE POLICY
The Obama Administration did not use a single, readily identifiable mech-
amism to ingrain climate-consciousness in the federal bureaucracy. Rather,
President Obama's fourth pillar intervened at multiple points, was systematic,
and was less visible due to its widely dispersed character. Nevertheless, this ad-
vancement of climate-consciousness was no less significant than the Obama
Administration's headline-grabbing presidential actions like the Clean Power
Plan and the United States' accession to the Paris Climate Change Agreement.
This Part proceeds in four Sections. Section L.A briefly surveys the existing
literature on "presidential administration," with particular attention to critiques
about democratic accountability and effective bureaucratic administration.
Against that backdrop, Section I.B explores the unique attributes of climate
change as a public problem, observing that an effective response to climate
change requires climate-consciousness to suffuse the federal bureaucracy. Sec-
tion I.C is the heart of this Note's descriptive account. It describes six distinct
policy tools that the Obama Administration applied to advance climate-
conscious reasoning in the executive branch. Section I.D analyzes how these
fourth-pillar mechanisms reinforced and complemented each other.
A. Background on Presidential Administration
Starting with President Reagan, chief executives have wielded forceful
powers of "presidential administration" over the executive branch.23 As a gen-
eral matter, presidential administration refers to a recent trend toward consoli-
dation of administrative power in the presidency, especially through regulatory
22. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385 [http://perma.cc/G39V-BKCJM].
23. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2248, 2277-81 (2001); see
also Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92
TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1167-70 (2014) (arguing that the strength of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which was greatly empowered by the Reagan Administration,
fundamentally changed the administrative state). Note that accounts of presidential admin-
istration usually exclude foreign policy and military matters, which are more firmly within
exclusive executive control.
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review at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).2 4 By this account,
Presidents have increasingly taken public ownership of - and exerted "directive
authority" over - administrative actions instead of leaving agencies to their own
devices.25
Modern presidential administration started when President Reagan estab-
lished the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within OMB
and empowered it to veto regulations whose benefits did not exceed their
costs. 2 6 In then-Professor Elena Kagan's view, President Clinton brought presi-
dential administration to maturity by exerting even greater control over admin-
istrative agencies. This upended a "conventional view" of administrative law in
which "Congress possesses broad, although not unlimited, power to structure
the relationship between the President and the administration" alongside inter-
est groups that enhance agencies' accountability to the public.27
Kagan's account of President Clinton's Administration is notable in three
ways. First, President Clinton expanded his influence by using a wider array of
regulatory tools. At the "front end" of administrative actions, President Clinton
regularly issued formal directives that instructed agencies to issue rules or take
other administrative actions.28 During rulemaking, the Clinton Administration
used a "modified form of OMB [cost-benefit] review" that instructed OMB to
consider factors other than monetary costs and benefits.2 9 Once agencies acted,
24. Cf Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight ofAgency Decision Making, 108 MICH.
L. REv. 1127 (2010) (focusing on OMB as the key locus for presidential control of agency ac-
tivities).
25. Kagan, supra note 23, at 2319; cf Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 696, 704-05 (2007) (arguing for an "overseer, not
decider" vision of the President in administrative law).
26. See Kagan, supra note 23, at 2247; see also infra Section I.C.4 (explaining the history of regu-
latory review through OIRA).
27. Kagan, supra note 23, at 2250, 2253-55; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 461-91 (2003)
(explaining historical changes in theories of public administration); Kagan, supra note 23, at
2252 & n.12 (explaining that the Supreme Court has espoused such a view of administra-
tion); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667 (1975) (providing a canonical account of interest group control over administration,
which was secured with procedural protections for public participation in administrative
processes); Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REv. 359, 402-03 &
nn.182-91 (2017) (characterizing this "conventional" view of administrative law).
28. Kagan, supra note 23, at 2285, 2290-93; see also id. at 2294-95 (noting that Presidents Reagan
and George H.W. Bush issued a total of thirteen directives "regarding substantive regulatory
policy" whereas President Clinton issued 107 such directives).
29. Id. at 2285-89.
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President Clinton took "personal appropriation"o by "presenting them to the
public as his own-the products of his values and decisions."" Second, Presi-
dent Clinton aggressively pushed a pro-regulatory and progressive vision of
presidential control, a sharp contrast to the Reagan Administration's use of
presidential control for deregulatory ends.3 2 Third, President Clinton's use of
presidential administration operated in public view, departing from the Reagan
and Bush I Administrations' practice of exerting control behind closed doors.
Kagan claimed that President Clinton's administrative efforts enhanced the ac-
countability and effectiveness of the federal bureaucracy, arguing that "the new
presidentialization of administration renders the bureaucratic sphere more
transparent and responsive to the public, while also better promoting important
kinds of regulatory competence and dynamism."34 President Clinton's use of ag-
gressive and novel control mechanisms laid the groundwork for President
Obama's administrative innovations to address climate change.
Nonetheless, critics have objected to this "strong" form of presidential ad-
ministration. Setting aside constitutional critiques of unitary executivism," ar-
30. Id. at 2285.
31. Id. at 2299-300. This account of President Clinton's expansive use of directives is confirmed
by studies of administrative agencies and historical studies of presidential control. In an arti-
cle that surveyed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials from the Clinton years,
Professors Lisa Schultz Bressman and Michael P. Vandenbergh observed that during the
Clinton Administration, directives gradually overshadowed OMB-OIRA review as the pri-
mary means of presidential control over agency actions. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Mi-
chael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presiden-
tial Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (20o6). In an exhaustively researched book, Steven G.
Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo confirm Justice Kagan's view that President Clinton's con-
trol of administration went beyond historical precedents. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTO-
PHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH
391-99 (2008).
32. Kagan, supra note 23, at 2249, 2315-16.
33. Id. at 2316.
34. Id. at 2252 (emphasis added).
35. As might be expected, there is a closely related debate over the constitutionality of the uni-
tary executive. Yet, Kagan largely sidestepped this debate in Presidential Administration by
"taking ... as a given" the validity of the Supreme Court's removal jurisprudence and taking
an intermediate view that the President has broad but not unitary control over the executive
branch. Id. at 2326.
Although the debate over the constitutionality of the unitary executive is worthy of at-
tention, it is outside of the domain of this Note. For defenses of a unitary executive, see Ste-
ven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE
L.J. 541 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). For a seminal argument against a unitary executive, see Law-
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guments against strong presidential administration generally rest on a pair of
intertwined concerns: (1) that presidential influence crowds out agency exper-
tise; and (2) that presidential administration fails to achieve Kagan's purported
benefits of enhanced democratic accountability and effective administration.3 6
Most of these critiques have been directed at GIRA, whose cost-benefit-
oriented oversight over rulemaking has been criticized as opaque, preclusive of
congressional oversight, vulnerable to politicization, insufficiently deferential
to agency expertise, 7 and sporadic." GIRA has also been accused-depending
on the administration- of conducting cost-benefit regulatory review with de-
regulatory and anti-environmental biases." In response to such concerns,
scholars have proposed strategies to reconcile this perceived tension between
presidential control and technocratic expertise. These proposals include
stronger internal checks on presidential administration,4 0 judicial oversight
over presidential influence,4 1 and mandatory disclosures of presidential influ-
ence. 4 2
These competing accounts expose the chimeric nature of presidential ad-
ministration. Presidential administration may enhance democratic responsive-
rence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(1994).
36. See, e.g., Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality,
and Reasons, 61 DuKE L.J. 1811, 1815-16, 1818-29 (2012) (expressing skepticism over "presi-
dentialism" and describing the "political turn" in administrative law by pointing to Motor
Vehicles Manufacturers Assn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983), and F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009), as two touchstone cas-
es).
37. Farber & O'Connell, supra note 23, at 1174-75; see also Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note
31, at 78 (noting that bureaucrats within the EPA did not view OIRA review as sufficiently
visible to the public). But cf Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821, 873-74 (2003) (positing that OIRA's career
staff may provide consistency across presidential administrations and reduce the risk of po-
liticized regulatory review).
38. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 31, at 67.
39. See Croley, supra note 37, at 872-73; infra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
40. Short, supra note 36, at 1879-80 (citing Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship
Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMoRY L.J. 423, 444 (2009)); see also
Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2346 (20o6) (describing how internal separations of power
in the State Department provide a "modest internal checking function").
41. Cf Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119
YALE L.J. 2, 32-45 (2009) (arguing that there are benefits to the incorporation of political
considerations into arbitrary-and-capricious review).
42. See Mendelson, supra note 24, at 1163-70.
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ness by consolidating power in a nationally representative President, or erode
democratic responsiveness by weakening congressional control of federal de-
partments and agencies. Presidential administration may promote competence
by providing room for bureaucrats to make sound scientific and technical deci-
sions, or erode agency expertise by providing a channel for covert executive in-
terference. Presidential administration may promote transparency due to sharp
public scrutiny of presidential actions, or increase bureaucratic opacity by em-
powering the President to influence decisions behind closed doors and later
disavow those decisions.
As this Part demonstrates, the Obama Administration's fourth pillar exhib-
ited a similarly complex story with one exception: although the Obama Ad-
ministration vacillated between transparency or opacity and public participa-
tion or non-participation, it consistently respected scientific, economic, and
technical expertise. Rigorous evidentiary norms were necessary to properly re-
spond to climate change, a particularly vexing public problem.
B. The Need for Climate-Consciousness
In the abstract, climate change appears to be a simple problem: climate
change is caused by an excessive buildup of greenhouse gases in the Earth's at-
mosphere, and reversing that buildup in a timely fashion would largely halt an-
thropogenic global warming. Yet from the perspective of concrete policy re-
sponses, climate change is a problem of unparalleled scale, scope, and
complexity that tests the outer limits of society's ability to solve common prob-
lems.43 This Section describes the unique difficulties climate change poses for
the federal government. These difficulties required a broad and diverse array of
presidential interventions to embed climate-consciousness throughout the ex-
ecutive branch.
Climate change is an extreme collective action problem -greenhouse gases
are emitted from virtually every sphere of human activity and numerous natu-
ral systems. Likewise, climate change has many consequences. In the worst-
case scenario, unmitigated climate change has the potential to cause cata-
strophic long-term damage, including heat waves that render human habita-
tion impossible in parts of the Persian Gulf;44 sea-level rise that displaces mil-
43. See generally Kelly Levin et al., Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining
Our Future Selves To Ameliorate Global Climate Change, 45 POL'Y SCl. 123 (2012) (describing
the unique attributes of climate change as a public problem).
44. Jeremy S. Pal & Elfatih A.B. Eltahir, Future Temperature in Southwest Asia Projected To Exceed a
Threshold for Human Adaptability, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 197, 197-98 (2016) (explain-
ing that under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's higher-warming scenarios,
181
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
lions from low-lying coastal cities;45 widespread changes in migration pat-
terns ;46 major shifts in the world's climate system, including shutdowns of ma-
jor ocean currents that regulate large-scale heat transport; 47 drought, famine,
and epidemics; 48 a sixth mass extinction of animal and plant species; 49 and
changes in extreme weather events.o Moreover, climate change impacts are al-
ready widespread" and human society-even if greenhouse gas emissions were
parts of the Persian Gulf will - by the end of the century - regularly experience wet-bulb
temperatures that render human habitation impossible without air conditioning); see also
John Schwartz, Deadly Heat Is Forecast in Persian Gulf by 21oo, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 26, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2o15/1o/27/science/intolerable-heat-may-hit-the-middle-east-by
-the-end-of-the-century.html [http://perma.cc/WF7Y-TAM9] (explaining the study in
layperson's terms).
45. Gardiner Harris, Borrowed Time on Disappearing Land, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2o14/o3/29/world/asia/facing-rising-seas-bangladesh-confronts
-the-consequences-of-climate-change.html [http://perma.cc/84FF-Y6T5] (illustrating this
phenomenon by examining present and future climate change impacts in Bangladesh).
46. See Clionadh Raleigh et al., Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration
and Conflict, WORLD BANK GROUP (2008), http://siteresources.worldbank.org
/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/SDCCWorkingPaper MigrationandConflict
.pdf [http://perma.cc/6NSX-CKEE] (assessing these risks in detail).
47. See infra notes 191-192 and accompanying text. For a layperson's explanation, see Nicola
Jones, How Climate Change Could Jam the World's Ocean Circulation, YALE ENv'T 360
(Sept. 6, 2016), http://e360.yale.edu/features/will-climate-change jam the-globalocean
-conveyor belt [http://perma.cc/D8J8-M4GH].
48. See Nafeez Ahmed, "Whole World" at Risk from Simultaneous Droughts, Famines, Epidemics:
Scientists, GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2013 9:29 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment
/earth-insight/2o13/dec/17/planet-climate-change-risk-drought-famine-epidemic [http://
perma.cc/8D26-2TG9] (explaining key findings from a series of studies by the Inter-
Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project, a project initiated by the Potsdam Institute
for Climate Impact Research and recently published in the Proceedings of the National Acade-
my of Sciences).
49. See, e.g., Anthony D. Barnosky et al., Has the Earth's Sixth Mass Extinction Already Arrived?,
471 NATURE 51 (2011).
so. Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters To Advance Climate Change
Adaptation: Summary for Policymakers, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
5-7 (2012), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/SREXFullReport.pdf [http://
perma.cc/LV6N-GCR6].
si. Christopher B. Field et al., Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability:
Summary for Policymakers, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2014),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/ars wgIlspm en.pdf [http://perma
.cc/YW3S-R5SW] (noting that the effects of climate change are being felt "on all continents
and across the oceans"); see also Eric Holthaus, The Point of No Return: Climate Change
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immediately cut to zero -would continue to experience increasingly severe cli-
mate change impacts for centuries.52
Given the scale of the challenge, the Obama Administration did not stop at
major greenhouse gas regulations and international agreements on climate
change. The White House tried to respond in a commensurate fashion by re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions from the federal government itself (a major
emitter in its own right), improving the federal government's resilience to the
impacts of climate change, and bolstering the federal government's capacity to
deal with future climate-induced problems in an uncertain world. The scale of
this challenge is as sweeping as the federal government itself. Climate change
implicates virtually every executive branch department and agency ranging
from the Department of Energy (DOE)ss to the Department of Labor;54 inde-
pendent agencies ranging from the SEC" to the Export-Import Bank;5 6 and
military operations ranging from Arctic naval activities" to disaster relief." As
of 2010, the U.S. government's greenhouse gas emissions totaled over 120 meg-
atons of carbon-dioxide-equivalent" -roughly equal to annual emissions from
52. See Gerald A. Meehl et al., How Much More Warming and Sea Level Rise?, 307 Scl. 1769
(2005).
53. Climate Change, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY, http://energy.gov/science-innovation/climate-change
[http://perma.cc/6FAC-GD24] (detailing DOE's involvement with climate change).
54. Green jobs, U.S. DEP'T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/odep/topics/GreenJobs.htm [http://perma
.cc/F2VA-HMRJ] (claiming that the Department of Labor is "a federal government leader in
creating a clean energy economy").
55. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg.
6290-91 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231 & 241) (providing guidance
on corporate disclosures of climate-related risks).
56. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Spinelli, No. 02-4106, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23,
2005) (challenging the Export-Import Bank's failure to conduct National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) assessments that adequately considered climate change). This suit
was later settled. Landmark Global Warming Lawsuit Settled, GREENPEACE, http://
www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/landmark-global-warming-lawsui [http://perma.cc/NLL6
-4MCL].
57. See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1 5 -55 6, ARCTIC PLANNING: DOD EXPECTS To
PLAY A SUPPORTING ROLE TO OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES AND HAS EFFORTS UNDER WAY To
ADDRESS CAPABILITY NEEDS AND UPDATE PLANS (2015).
58. See E.D. McGrady et al., Climate Change: Potential Effects on Demands for U.S. Military Hu-
manitarian Assistance and Disaster Response, CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES (2010), http://www
.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA 5 6497 5 [http://perma.cc/47RT-NGRKC].
59. Leon Walker, Fed Carbon Footprint: 121.3 Million Metric Tons; Lion's Share Is DOD, ENVTL.
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Belgium or the Czech Republic.6 0 As of 2015, the federal government was the
largest single electricity purchaser in the United States61 and had an environ-
mental footprint that spanned "360,ooo buildings, 650,ooo fleet vehicles, and
$445 billion spent annually on goods and services." 62 A wide range of other fed-
eral programs and activities structure incentives for non-federal actors in ways
that affected emission levels and vulnerability to climate change risks.63
To achieve its goals, the Obama Administration advanced climate-
consciousness in the federal bureaucracy. Climate-consciousness accounts for
how a federal action might affect climate change and how climate change might
affect a federal action, even for actions that are not obviously connected to cli-
mate change. At its best, climate-consciousness would embed the consideration
of climate change throughout the executive branch, rely on sound scientific and
technical evidence to understand an uncertain future, and incorporate climate
change into decisions in a transparent and accountable manner. Such climate-
consciousness responded to a judicial demand for reasoned administration on
climate change, while avoiding congressional scrutiny by changing administra-
tive processes in a submerged fashion that attracted less attention than major
climate change regulations and international agreements.
As the next Section demonstrates, the Obama Administration used a variety
of tools to enable, encourage, or require climate-consciousness. Although the
6o. CAIT Climate Data Explorer, Total GHG Emissions Including Land-Use Change and Forestry -
2010, WORLD RESOURCES INST., http://cait2.wri.org/historical/Country/2oGHG
%2oEmissions?indicator[] =Total%2oGHG%2oEmissions%2olncluding%2oLand-Use
%20Change%2oand%2oForestry&year[]=20 o&sortldx= o&sortDir=desc&chartType= geo
[http://perma.cc/8CBF-BY-EE]. As with all emissions estimates, this should be regarded as
a rough estimate and not a precise figure.
61. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, White House, Fact Sheet: Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions in the Federal Government and Across the Supply Chain (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2o15/03/19/fact-sheet-reducing
-greenhouse-gas-emissions-federal-govemment-and-acro [http://perma.cc/IKY94-F6NF].
62. Council on Envtl. Quality, Federal Leadership on Climate Change and Environmental Sustaina-
bility -Executive Order 13693, WHITE HOUSE, http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/sustainability [http://perma.cc/Z483-SJS3].
63. Examples of such incentives -both direct and indirect-abound. For example, the Conser-
vation Reserve Program (CRP) -a federal program that purchases conservation easements
for soil conservation, water quality, and wildlife habitat -also sequesters substantial quanti-
ties of carbon dioxide. See Conservation Reserve Program, So Fed. Reg. 41987, 41991 (July
16, 2015) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 1410) (noting that " [t]he purpose of CRP" is, inter
alia, "to assist producers in conserving and improving soil, water, and wildlife, restoring
wetlands, improving other resources"); see also Gervasio Pifieiro et al., Set-Asides Can Be Bet-
ter Climate Investment than Corn Ethanol, 19 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 277 (2009) (arguing
that the CRP has major climate change benefits, and that such lands should not be convert-
ed to cropland for ethanol production).
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Obama Administration used top-down directives and incentives to require and
encourage agency responses, agencies were granted autonomy to incorporate
climate-consciousness in a bottom-up fashion. This unique blend of control
and co-optation was well-suited given the complexity of climate change.
C. Applying Presidential Administration to Climate-Consciousness
President Obama is known to have followed in the footsteps of President
Clinton, making heavy use of centralized regulatory review, issuing numerous
presidential directives and personally claiming credit for administrative ac-
tions.6 4 However, this narrative misses the fourth pillar, where President
Obama developed the practice of presidential administration in significant
ways.
Even though presidential administration has strengthened in recent dec-
ades, exercises of presidential administration have nevertheless been confined:
Presidents have targeted a small number of agencies, pursued relatively self-
contained policy objectives, or used a limited range of methods to advance each
policy objective. For example, President Clinton exercised control over a rela-
tively small number of agencies to address discrete problems like tobacco con-
trol, gun control, and welfare reform.65 Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush
sought to reduce regulatory costs across a wide array of agency actions by heav-
ily relying on a single tool, centralized regulatory review.66
By contrast, President Obama's fourth pillar affected virtually all depart-
ments and agencies, addressed a broad and seemingly unbounded public prob-
lem,67 and applied a wider array of tools than Kagan identified.68 Of course, the
Obama White House made heavy use of the tools written about by Kagan: the
President still issued presidential directives, incorporated climate change into at
64. Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REv. 683, 698-705 (2016).
65. See Kagan, supra note 23, at 2248, 2303-08; see also Barack Obama, Commentary, The Presi-
dent's Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 13o HARV. L. REv. 811, 823-35 (2017) (de-
scribing how the Obama Administration used a relatively narrow set of tactics to reform the
federal criminal justice system that focused on a small number of federal departments and
agencies, including the Department of Justice, Department of Education, and Office of Per-
sonnel Management).
66. Watts, supra note 64, at 693-98.
67. In a helpful article, Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi explain the difficulties posed when prob-
lems cut across multiple agencies and into "shared regulatory space." See Jody Freeman &
Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135-36
(2012). Climate change may be considered an extreme version of such a problem.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
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least some cost-benefit analyses, and publicly represented agencies' climate-
related actions as the President's own.6 9 Yet the Obama Administration used a
much broader array of policy tools: it exercised budgetary control in order to
secure compliance with presidential directives, used scientific processes to in-
form climate-related decisions, and elicited voluntary climate-conscious com-
mitments from private-sector actors such as federal suppliers and contractors. 70
This creative and wide-ranging approach to presidential administration
was necessary in light of President Obama's limited formal legal authority to
mandate climate-consciousness. After all, most efforts to address highly cross-
cutting problems through presidential oversight are anchored in statutes7 1 that
impose compulsory analytical requirements on agencies. 72 However, there is no
specific legislative mandate for federal departments and agencies to be climate-
conscious when making decisions. Consequently, the Obama Administration
found it necessary to "pool" powers and resources from a multitude of sources
to address climate change despite congressional hostility to climate action.74
Although climate change may be a sui generis public problem, the case
studies that follow provide a rich example of presidential administration at its
most expansive, illustrating how the President can combine myriad tools to in-
fluence and direct the executive branch. President Obama's efforts were espe-
cially notable for their reliance on rigorous scientific, economic, and technical
analyses, belying the common assumption that there is an irreconcilable ten-
sion between agency expertise and presidential control.
69. Watts, supra note 64, at 698-705.
70. Cf id. at 685 (describing President Obama's methods of presidential control as "taking a cue
from" President Clinton's example).
71. E.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2012) (ensuring that the needs of small
businesses are considered in the regulatory process).
72. Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous
Enterprise, 55 U. ToRONTOL.J. 497, 5o6-07 (2005).
73. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2012), has been
interpreted to require agencies to consider climate change in some instances. See infra Sec-
tions I.C.3, II.B. However, NEPA-a statute passed in 1970, before climate change was
widely acknowledged as a public problem - does not explicitly contemplate climate change.
74. Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 218-19, 255-56 (2015) (explaining the
concept of "pooling" as a form of "unilateral structuring by the executive" that "integrates
legal or other resources possessed by -and dispersed across - . . . agencies" and provides a




PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND CLIMATE-CONSCIOUSNESS
1. Directives Issued Through Executive Orders
President Obama's climate-related executive orders can be divided into two
categories. The first consisted of a hodgepodge of orders that applied to only a
few agencies or addressed a narrow set of policy issues. 75 The second catego-
ry-the subject of this Section-consisted of three broad executive orders that
implicated every executive-branch agency and department.
Executive orders relating to federal energy efficiency and conservation have
been issued since the Ford Administration. 76 By the time President Obama en-
75. Examples of this sort of executive order include Executive Order 13,547, an interagency order
to implement certain ocean- and lake-management initiatives and establish an interagency
National Ocean Council; Executive Order 13,677, a mandate for the United States Agency
for International Development to "integrat[e] climate-resilience considerations" into its de-
velopment work; Executive Order 13,689, a mandate to enhance interagency and intergov-
ernmental cooperation in the rapidly melting Arctic; Executive Order 13,690, a directive for
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to account for climate change when
designating floodplains; and Executive Order 13,728, a mandate to improve wildfire resili-
ence for certain federally owned, leased, or financed buildings in wildfire-prone areas. Exec.
Order No. 13,728, 81 Fed. Reg. 32223 (May 20, 2016); Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg.
43023 (July 19, 2010); Exec. Order No. 13,677, 79 Fed. Reg. 58231 (Sept. 23, 2014); Exec. Or-
der No. 13,689, So Fed. Reg. 4191 (Jan. 21, 2015); Exec. Order No. 13,690, So Fed. Reg. 6425
(Jan. 30, 2015); see Molly Lawrence & Carly Summers, President's Executive Order Expands
Regulated Floodplain To Account for Climate Change, VAN NESS FELDMAN LLP (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://www.vnf.com/presidents-executive-order-expands-regulated-floodplain-to-account
[http://perma.cc/CZ7Q-7JU5].
76. These orders started around the time of the 1970s oil shocks and were gradually strength-
ened by successive presidential administrations. Exec. Order No. 11,912, 41 Fed. Reg. 15825
(Apr. 13, 1976) (directing the General Services Administration to ensure that the federal
government purchases fuel-efficient vehicles; ordering federal departments and agencies to
implement provisions in contemporary statutes relating to energy conservation; directing
the Secretary of Energy, OMB Director, and the General Services Administrator to develop a
plan for energy conservation in federal buildings; and directing each executive agency to de-
velop and submit a ten-year plan for saving energy and fuel); Exec. Order No. 12,003, 42
Fed. Reg. 37523 (July 20, 1977) (setting numerical targets for fuel efficiency in federal gov-
ernment vehicle fleets and energy conservation in federal buildings, and refining require-
ments in Executive Order 11,912); Exec. Order No. 12,759, 56 Fed. Reg. 16257 (Apr. 17, 1991)
(amending existing federal efficiency and conservation standards; extending energy efficien-
cy mandates to require that agencies consider the energy embodied in products that they
procure); Exec. Order No. 12,845, 58 Fed. Reg. 21887 (Apr. 21, 1993) (requiring the purchase
of energy-efficient computer equipment); Exec. Order No. 12,902, 59 Fed. Reg. 11463 (Mar.
8, 1994) (updating requirements for energy efficiency and water conservation in federal fa-
cilities); Exec. Order No. 13,101, 63 Fed. Reg. 49643 (Sept. 14, 1998) (issuing new require-
ments for waste prevention and recycling, and requiring that federal departments and agen-
cies take end-of-life factors into account when purchasing goods); Exec. Order No. 13,132,
64 Fed. Reg. 30851 (June 3, 1999) (updating energy efficiency requirements for federal facil-
ities, establishing a renewable energy goal for federal facilities, and imposing a greenhouse
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tered office, these orders had expanded to address greenhouse gas emission re-
ductions, recycling and waste reduction, and federal purchases of energy-
efficient goods. However, President Obama's three orders built upon previous
orders by imposing more rigorous planning requirements, placing a novel fo-
cus on adapting to the effects of climate change, setting more stringent emis-
sion reduction goals, and placing public pressure on federal contractors and
suppliers to reduce their environmental impacts.
The first of the three orders, Executive Order 13,514, was issued in 2009.
Most of the Order's provisions focused on strengthening energy efficiency
standards, emissions reductions goals, and other targets articulated in previous
executive orders.7 ' However, Executive Order 13,514 contained two novel re-
quirements. First, the Order directed the White House Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ) and OMB to help each agency create a "Strategic Sus-
tainability Performance Plan."7 9 The sustainability planning process required
each agency to:
* issue a comprehensive plan that accounted for the achievement of all
environmental goals imposed upon the agency by executive order;
* inventory its emissions;
gas reduction goal for federal facilities of 30% between 1990 and 2010); Exec. Order No.
13,148, 65 Fed. Reg. 24595 (Apr. 21, 2000) (requiring each agency to implement so-called
"environmental management systems," report toxic releases, change landscaping practices,
and limit the purchase of hazardous or toxic substances); Exec. Order No. 13,149, 65 Fed.
Reg. 24607 (Apr. 21, 2000) (updating efficiency standards for federal vehicle fleets); Exec.
Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (Jan. 24, 2007) (setting a percentage reduction goal for
greenhouse gases from federal agencies, a percentage reduction goal for water use, measures
for sustainable procurement, requirements for high-performance building practices for new
or renovated buildings, and standards for the use of non-gasoline and hybrid vehicles; man-
dating that agencies appoint officers for carrying out the Order; requiring departments and
agencies to establish management systems for environmental practices; directing depart-
ments and agencies to train federal employees in environmental management; establishing
the Federal Environmental Executive, an EPA office tasked with monitoring agencies; and
envisioning a central coordinating role for CEQ and OMB).
77. Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52117 (Oct. 5, 2009).
78. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, White House, Executive Order 13514- Focused on
Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-signs-executive
-order-focused-federal-leadership-environmental-ener [http://perma.cc/HZ2B-HLZG]
("The Executive Order builds on and expands the energy reduction and environmental re-
quirements of Executive Order 13,423 by making reductions of greenhouse gas emissions a
priority of the Federal government, and by requiring agencies to develop sustainability plans
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* set a multiyear greenhouse gas reduction goal in consultation with
CEQ and OMB;
* prioritize agency responses by their returns on investment;
* integrate sustainability objectives into the agency's budgetary process;
and
* subject its plan to "scorecard"-based interagency comparisons.so
Although not required by the Order, the Obama Administration also sub-
jected these sustainability plans to public comment." Essentially, Executive
Order 13,514 required departments and agencies not only to set abstract goals,
but also to establish concrete plans to achieve them. This planning process re-
quired each agency to account for the environmental, energy, and climate
change-related mandates that had built up between the Ford and George W.
Bush Administrations.
Second, Executive Order 13,514 mandated agencies to set targets for the re-
duction of indirect greenhouse gas emissions, or so-called "Scope 3" emis-
sions.82 Scope 3 emissions consist of emissions that are "a consequence of the
agency['s] activities, but originate from sources not controlled by the agency.""
This includes emissions stemming from activities such as employee travel and
commuting, emissions from contractors, and even emissions from visitors trav-
eling to national parks.8 4 A broader definition of emissions ensured that federal
departments and agencies - at the cost of a higher analytical burden - more ful-
ly considered the emissions consequences of their actions. Executive Order
13,514 was therefore an early indicator of the design attributes of the fourth pil-
lar: the Order combined a top-down directive with a bottom-up approach to
agency planning, and the Order pushed agencies to assess their climate impacts
in a more complete and rigorous fashion.
Two later executive orders-Executive Orders 13,653 and 13,693-continued
that evolution. In 2013, Executive Order 13,653 mandated-for the first time-a
wide array of adaptive actions by agencies to make federal activities more resili-
80. Exec. Order No. 13,514, §§ 2, 4, 8, 74 Fed. Reg. 52117 (Oct. 5, 2009).
81. Council on Envtl. Quality, Obama Administration Releases Agency Strategic Sustainability Per-
formance Plans, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT (Feb. 7, 2013), http://obamawhitehouse.archives
.gov/administration/eop/ceq/PressReleases/February o7_2013 [http://perma.cc/63AA
-JFYN].
82. Exec. Order No. 13,514, § 2(b), 74 Fed. Reg. 52117 (Oct. 5, 2009).
83. Council on Envtl. Quality, Federal Greenhouse Gas Accounting and Reporting Guidance, EXEC-
UTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT app. C, C-1 (June 4, 2012), http://obamawhitehouse.archives
.gov/sites/default/files/federal-greenhouse gas-accounting and reporting guidance
technical-support document.pdf [http://perma.cc/X6GM-SL5C].
84. Id. at 11-13.
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ent to climate-induced disruptions." This was consonant with a shift in cli-
mate-change thinking, in which policymakers started to pursue climate change
adaptation in addition to efforts to mitigate climate change by reducing emis-
sions.86 The Order built upon previous requirements by requiring each agency
to understand and prepare for the consequences that climate change would im-
pose on the federal government.
Finally, in 2015, Executive Order 13,693 replaced Executive Order 13,514-
The Order established an aggressive target for federal emissions reductions of
roughly 40% over the span of a decade." This target was notably ambitious,
far outpacing California's widely lauded goal of reducing emissions by 40% be-
tween 1990 and 2030.9 The Order was announced along with a host of volun-
tary pledges from major federal contractors to reduce their emissions,9 0 as well
85. Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66819 (Nov. 1, 2013). Although section 16 of Executive
Order 13,514 mandated agency participation in an interagency Climate Change Adaptation
Task Force, the Order did not compel action by agencies. Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed.
Reg. 52117 (Oct. 5, 2009); President Obama Establishes Task Force and Council on Climate
Change Preparedness, GEO. CLIMATE CTR. (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.georgetownclimate
.org/articles/president-obama-establishes-task-force-and-council-on-climate-change
-preparedness.html [http://perma.cc/U4Q4-UGMT].
86. Climate-change adaptation has-until very recently-been a "taboo" subject, as climate-
change adaptation implies that significant climate-induced damage will occur. This taboo
lifted as it became clear that climate-induced harms were unavoidable. Although I cannot
pinpoint exactly when the taboo lifted, it persisted until relatively recently. See Roger Pielke,
Jr. et al., Climate Change 2oo7: Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation, 445 NATURE 597, 597-98
(2007) (calling on observers to depart from the treatment of climate-change adaptation as a
taboo subject).
Executive Order 13,693 convened a Climate Preparedness and Resilience Task Force
consisting of local, state, and tribal leaders, whose recommendations spurred numerous ex-
ecutive initiatives to support climate adaptation and resilience measures by local, state, and
tribal governments. President Obama Establishes Task Force and Council on Climate Change
Preparedness, supra note 85; Council on Envtl. Quality, Fact Sheet: Recommendations of the
President's State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience and
New Executive Actions, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT (Nov. 17, 2014), http://obamawhitehouse
.archives. gov/the-press-office/2014/11/17/fact-sheet-recommendations-president's-state
-local-and-tribal-leaders [http://perma.cc/JJ3V-8VCQ].
87. Exec. Order No. 13,693, 80 Fed. Reg. 15871 (Mar. 19, 2015).
88. Cf Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (Jan. 24, 2007) (mandating a 30% reduction in
energy use over twelve years).
89. Chris Megerian & Liam Dillon, Gov. Brown Signs Sweeping Legislation To Combat Climate
Change, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-jerry-brown
-signs-climate-laws-2o16o9o8-snap-story.html [http://perma.cc/B8TM-DD3P].
go. Participating suppliers and contractors included Honeywell, IBM, and General Electric. Juli-
et Eilperin, Obama To Cut Federal Government's Carbon Emissions 40 Percent Over lo Years,
WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment
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as a scorecard to compare federal contractors on their greenhouse gas reduction
initiatives." This pledging and competitive scoring campaign brought public
attention to leaders and laggards among federal contractors that received hun-
dreds of billions of federal dollars per year.92 Pressuring private actors into cli-
mate-consciousness moved beyond the traditional domain of presidential ad-
ministration; it leveraged the federal government's massive economic power to
incentivize an even broader array of actors to consider climate change in their
decision making.
In sum, President Obama's executive orders required agencies to engage in
structured sustainability planning processes, compelled agencies to consider
adaptation and resilience measures, and attempted to influence major federal
suppliers through both co-option and competitive benchmarking. Further-
more, the Obama Administration exercised presidential administration in a
transparent and publicly oriented manner, even encouraging members of the
public to pressure federal contractors into taking climate-friendly actions. The
executive orders also demonstrated a concern with administrative effectiveness
by mandating federal departments and agencies to comply with executive or-
ders in an organized fashion. These developments represented a more expan-
sive and sophisticated iteration of presidential administration.
2. OIB Budgetary Control
The Obama Administration wielded its powers of budgetary oversight to
ensure that federal departments and agencies followed climate change-related
executive orders. This fell squarely within the President's statutory duty to
submit a budget to Congress," which empowers the President to deny agency
budget requests that do not comport with his policy preferences.9 4
/wp/2015/03/19/obama-to-cut-federal-govemments-carbon-emission [http://perma.cc
/4BSP-AEFU].
91. Council on Envtl. Quality, Federal Supplier Greenhouse Gas Management Scorecard, EXECUTIVE
OFF. PRESIDENT, http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives
/sustainability/supplier-GHG [http://perma.cc/7W5L-9K631.
92. See Annual Review of Government Contracting: 2015 Edition, NAT'L CONT. MGMT. AsS'N &
BLOOMBERG Gov'T (2015), http://www.ncmahq.org/docs/default-source/default-document
-library/pdfs/exec1s---ncma-annual-review-of-government-contracting-2015-edition
[http://perma.cc/UH5H-KLTH].
93. See Budget and Accounting (Good-McCormick) Act of 1921, § 201, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42
Stat. 20 (1921) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
94. Eloise Pasachoff, The President's Budget as a Source ofAgency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182,
2199-2200, 2213-26 (2016) (describing the powerful roles of OMB's Resource Management
Officers and the leverage associated with OMB's power to control agency budget requests).
191
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
OMB, the largest office in the Executive Office of the President, prepares
the President's budget proposal and serves as a key focal point for presidential
administration by "embed[ding] the administration's various management ini-
tiatives in agency budget requests."" At the budget-setting stage, the White
House communicates its preferences to federal departments and agencies
through ad hoc communication between OMB and agency heads, memoranda
issued by the OMB Director, and Circular A-11, a document that provides in-
structions to agencies about the development and submission of budget re-
quests. 96 Since much of Circular A-11 is technical and does not change from
year to year,97 any non-technical change to the Circular sends a clear message to
departments and agencies.
During the first term of the Obama presidency, OMB was generally silent
on climate change. The only exceptions were a brief mention of global warm-
ing in a 2009 budget letter," minor treatment of climate change in 2009 and
2010 memoranda outlining the President's "Science and Technology Priori-
ties,"" and incidental references to energy efficiency in other memoranda. 00 In
2011, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found two "key fac-
tors" that "complicate [d] . . . efforts" to "align climate change funding with
strategic priorities": "(1) the lack of a shared understanding of federal strategic
priorities among federal officials and (2) the fact that existing mechanisms that
could help align agency funding with priorities [were] nonbinding, limiting
95. Id. at 221o.
96. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular No. A-n: Preparation, Submission and Execution of the
Budget, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT (July 2016), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites
/default/files/omb/assets/allcurrent year/all_2o16.pdf [http://perma.cc/9CV6-Q9JN].
97. Pasachoff, supra note 94, at 2210. Note that OMB issues budget memoranda with much
greater frequency.
98. Memorandum No. M-o9-2o from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to
Heads of Dep'ts & Agencies (June II, 2009), http://fas.org/sgp/obama/who611o9.pdf
[http://perma.cc/93AT-T4G7].
99. Memorandum No. M-lo-3o from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, and
John P. Holdren, Dir., Office of Sci. Tech. Policy, to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies (July
21, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/20o
/mlo-30.pdf [http://perma.cc/S6PV-GHQN]; Memorandum No. M-o9-2 7 from Peter R.
Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, and John P. Holdren, Dir., Office of Sci. Tech. Poli-
cy, to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2009/mo9-27.pdf [http://perma.cc/3SX9
-WVWT].
ioo. See, e.g., Memorandum No. M-lo-o9 from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. &
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their effectiveness where they conflict[ed] with agency responsibilities and pri-
orities."' Clearly, the Obama Administration had not yet conveyed that cli-
mate change was a key priority.
Late in President Obama's second term, OMB explicitly turned its attention
to climate change by issuing a 2015 revision of its Circular A-11 guidance102 and
a 2016 memorandum issued jointly with CEQ and addressed to all agency and
department heads. 10 The Circular A-11 revision expressed an intention "to en-
sure that funding requests in support of Federal facilities align with the Admin-
istration's climate preparedness and resilience goals."104 The revision also refer-
enced two of President Obama's executive orders on climate change. First,
Circular A-11 required that "[i]f [an agency] is proposing construction of Fed-
eral facilities, [the agency] must: ... [clomply with Executive Order 13,693
and associated implementing instructions to ensure that [the agency is] adher-
ing to the Federal sustainable green buildings requirements." 0 Second, Circu-
lar A-11 required agencies to " [clomply with Executive Order 13,653, 'Preparing
the United States for the Impact of Climate Change,"' 10 6 the executive order
that had required federal departments and agencies to begin adapting to cli-
mate change. This revision to Circular A-11 demonstrated careful integration
between President Obama's executive orders and his budgetary power.
Memorandum No. M-16-o9 was similarly structured. Jointly issued in 2016
by OMB and CEQ that memorandum directed agencies to answer several
questions about their Climate Adaptation Plans, send agency representatives to
regular in-person progress reviews of Climate Adaptation Plans, "identify con-
crete next steps" for enhancing climate change adaptation measures, and take
action on OMB and CEQ recommendations.' In other words, Memorandum
No. M-16-o9 clearly conveyed that mere box-checking was not enough to
1o1. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-31 7 , CLIMATE CHANGE: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED
To CLARIFY NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND BETTER ALIGN THEM WITH FEDERAL FUNDING DECI-
SIONS 25 (2011).
102. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 96.
103. Memorandum No. M-16-o9 from Shaun Donovan, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, and
Christy Goldfuss, Managing Dir., Council on Envtl. Quality, to Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda
/2016/m-16-o9.pdf [http://perma.cc/NJG7-M2QW].
104. Ali Zaidi, Making Federal Investments Climate-Smart, WHITE HOUSE (July 1, 2015), http://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/o7/ol/making-federal-investments-climate
-smart [http://perma.cc/MU77-8J841.
105. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 96, at 31-5.
io6. Id. at 31-6.
107. Memorandum No. M-16-o9, supra note 103, at 2-3.
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comply with President Obama's executive orders. Like the revision to Circular
A-11, the memorandum drew a clear link between budgetary approval and
agency compliance with the Obama executive orders, stating, "These [in-
person progress review] discussions will also be an opportunity for agencies to
discuss priority issues and get feedback from OMB in advance of annual budg-
et submissions."108
The update to Circular A-11 and Memorandum No. M-16-o9 signaled that
the Obama Administration would use the appropriations process to secure
agency compliance with its climate change-related executive orders. Although
direct examination of the effects of Circular A-11 and the memorandum is im-
practicable due to OMB's opacity, the two documents presumably served as a
credible admonition to heed the executive orders. Otherwise, agency heads
would have run the risk of being required to resubmit their budget proposals
or face budgetary consequences.
In addition to using the budgetary process to incentivize compliance with
presidential directives on climate change, the Obama Administration disbursed
substantial funds to support climate change programs across federal depart-
ments and agencies. Although the precise extent of this funding is unknown,
an underinclusive estimate by the Congressional Research Service estimated
that it totaled $77 billion between 2008 and 2013.109 These disbursements were
scattered across the federal government under program names that often delib-
erately avoided use of the term "climate change," reflecting an effort to "inte-
grate climate programs into everything the federal government did" while hid-
ing disbursements from hostile political adversaries. 10
The Obama Administration, then, used a carrot-and-stick approach to
promote climate consciousness through budgetary measures. The message was
simple: agencies would be denied funding if their budgets did not comply with
presidential directives, but agencies could also expect low-profile budgetary
support for climate change initiatives. Although this alignment of incentives
was likely effective, budgetary control served as an opaque and unaccountable
form of presidential administration, raising significant transparency concerns.
io8. Id. at 2.
iog. Christopher Flavelle, To Protect Climate Money, Obama Stashed It Where It's Hard To
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3. Environmental Impact Assessments Under the National Environmental
Policy Act
Between 2010 and 2016, CEQ developed and released a guidance document
recommending that government actors consider climate change when review-
ing the environmental consequences of their actions pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 1 1 Although the guidance was nonbinding,
the guidance document was a clear call for climate-consciousness that also pro-
vided additional instructions on how agencies might incorporate climate
change into NEPA analyses. This enabling function was particularly important
given that -as discussed in Sections II.B and IV.B -judicial interpretations of
NEPA have increasingly imposed duties on departments and agencies to ac-
count for climate change when conducting NEPA assessments.
NEPA serves as a key anti-tunnel-vision statute that forces federal actors to
account for the environmental consequences of their actions and consider al-
ternatives.112 NEPA is expansive; it does not focus on a specific medium (e.g.,
surface water, air, or land) or specific human activities. Rather, NEPA aims to
comprehensively "balance a broad range of environmental factors.""' As "the
centerpiece of environmental regulations in the United States,"1 14 NEPA is ad-
ministered by CEQ, whose "limited resources preclude extensive involvement
in individual NEPA problems."" Instead, CEQ promulgates NEPA regula-
tions, issues guidance, and exercises oversight over each agency's procedures
that implement NEPA. 1 16
NEPA has broad applicability; it applies to "all agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment."' An agency triggers NEPA when it proposes a regulation or an "ac-
tion[] with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Fed-
eral control and responsibility"1 that "significantly affect[s] the quality of the
iii. Notice of Availability of Final Guidance, 81 Fed. Reg. 51866 (Aug. 5, 2016); Memorandum
from Christina Goldfuss, Chair, Council on Envtl. Quality, to Heads of Fed. Dep'ts &
Agencies (Aug. 1, 2016), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files
/documents/nepa final-ghg guidance.pdf [http://perma.cc/45UD-6Z3Z].
112. NICHOLAS C. YOST, NEPA DESKBOOK 3 (4 th ed. 2014).
113. Id. at 1.
114. New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3 d 683, 703 (loth Cir.
2009).
115. YOST, supra note 112, at 5.
116. Id.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (2012).
118. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2016).
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human environment."119 If an agency suspects that a regulation or action might
fall under NEPA, the agency first decides what type of evaluation it must un-
dertake. Agencies can categorically exclude certain sets of actions from their
NEPA procedures if the agency determines that those actions presumptively
lack "significant" environmental consequences. Agencies may also specify cer-
tain categories of actions as categorically requiring environmental impact
statements (EISs).
For proposals that do not fall within a categorical inclusion or exclusion,
agencies first conduct Environmental Assessments (EAs). An EA is a short and
publicly disclosed document that announces and explains the agency's deter-
mination about whether a full-blown EIS is necessary. The EA must include an
explanation of why the agency needs to take the action in question, a descrip-
tion of possible alternative actions, and a preliminary assessment of the envi-
ronmental consequences of the proposed action and its alternatives.1 2 0 If the
EA reaches a so-called Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) or uncovers
a viable alternative that results in no significant environmental impact,121 the
agency is finished with the NEPA process. If the EA finds that the proposed
agency action will have a significant environmental impact, the agency must
prepare an EIS.
In an EIS, the agency indicates how it plans to meet NEPA's goals, details
the purpose and need for the proposal, estimates the proposal's environmental
consequences, discusses alternatives to the proposal, analyzes how environ-
mental impacts may be mitigated, and identifies relevant information that is
either incomplete or unavailable to the agency.122 NEPA also requires a narrow
notice-and-comment process for EISs: the agency must circulate the EIS to
affected parties, obtain comments, and respond to comments.12 3 Courts have
characterized NEPA's requirements as procedural and not substantive.124 Yet
119. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C); see also John F. Shepherd & Hadassah M. Reimer, Range of Proposals
Covered by NEPA, in THE NEPA LITIGATION GUIDE 23, 25-28 (Albert M. Ferlo et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2012) (explaining how NEPA's regulations clarify the applicability of NEPA).
120. Id. at lo-11.
121. This is known as a "mitigated FONSI." Council on Envtl. Quality, The National Environmen-
tal Policy Act: A Study of Its Effectiveness After Twenty-Five Years, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT,
19-20 (Jan. 1997), http://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-publications/nepa25fn.pdf [http://perma.cc
/G6S2-QEKB].
122. YOST, supra note 112, at 15-21.
123. Id. at 22.
124. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
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NEPA appears to substantively influence many federal decisions,12 5 stakehold-
ers frequently comment in EIS processes, private litigants regularly bring chal-
lenges under NEPA, and the judiciary's comfort with enforcing procedural re-
quirements means that NEPA litigation is often effective in blocking or
delaying federal actions.126
Under previous administrations and during the Obama Administration's
first term, agencies usually did not consider climate change when conducting
NEPA EAs and EISs. For example, one scholar assessed thirty-five EISs issued
by the Bureau of Land Management from 2007 to 2008.127 Of those EISs, thir-
teen did not mention climate change at all; seven contained cursory statements
about climate change; and fifteen quantified greenhouse gas emissions. Of the
fifteen EISs that quantified emissions, only three discussed means to mitigate
emissions from the proposal, thereby fulfilling NEPA's mandate to consider al-
ternative actions or means to mitigate environmental damage.128 A 2012 study
by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law found that at least 227 EISs be-
tween 2009 and 2011 considered climate change,1 2 9 a small proportion of the
estimated 1,40o EISs issued in that period.13 o Moreover, the EISs that consid-
ered climate change varied widely in their depth and care of treatment.3
Against this backdrop, CEQ in 2010 began to develop a guidance document
on NEPA and climate change as part of a broader initiative to "Modernize and
125. The practical effectiveness of NEPA is highly contested. The best study of this matter was
conducted by CEQ in 1997 and argued that NEPA was substantively effective. Council on
Envtl. Quality, supra note 121.
126. Jennifer Klein & Ethan Strell, Legal Tools for Climate Adaptation Advocacy: NEPA, COLUM. L.
SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L. 6-8 (Mar. 2015), http://columbiaclimatelaw.com
/files/2ol6/o6/Klein-and-Strell-2o15-o3-Adaptation-Advocacy-NEPA.pdf [http://perma.cc
/NKF4-CYJR]. But see U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-369, NATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 20-21 (2014)
(noting that the federal government prevails in most NEPA litigation).
127. Amy L. Stein, Climate Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of Greenhouse
Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 473,505 (2010).
128. Id.
129. Patrick Woolsey, Consideration of Climate Change in Federal EISs, 2009-2011, CTR. FOR CLI-
MATE CHANGE L. 1, 7-14 (July 2012), http://wordpress.ei.columbia.edu/climate-change-law
/files/2ol6/o6/Woolsey-2012-o7-Consideration-of-Climate-Change-in-Federal-EISs-2009
-2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/PYD4-DFCD].
130. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the EPA, CEQ, and the
National Association of Environmental Professionals publish estimates of the number of fi-
nal EISs issued each year. There are minor inconsistencies between each group's reported to-
tals. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-369, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 8 tbl.1 (2014).
131. Woolsey, supra note 129, at 7-14.
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Reinvigorate the National Environmental Policy Act."132 CEQ issued draft doc-
uments in February 2010 and December 2014, and opened both to public
comment. The final guidance document, released in August 2016,1' recom-
mended that agencies consider climate change impacts, reasonable alternatives
that may reduce climate change impacts, and emissions mitigation measures in
their EAs and EISs.134 To evaluate the marginal impacts of greenhouse gas
emissions, the guidance document endorsed the use of a "social cost of carbon"
(SCC), an estimate of the present value of the social cost associated with an in-
cremental unit of emissions.' Importantly, the guidance did not advocate for
hard cost-benefit analysis; rather, the guidance acknowledged that agencies
might qualitatively consider climate change consequences that cannot be easily
quantified or valued. 13 6 This flexible approach was consistent with NEPA's im-
plementing regulations promulgated by CEQ, which instruct agencies to in-
clude poorly understood or non-quantifiable impacts."'
Although the Obama Administration's NEPA guidance on climate change
did not bind federal departments and agencies, the multiple rounds of notice-
and-comment, the thoroughness of the guidance document, and the influence
of CEQ in the appropriations process suggest that the Obama Administration
intended the guidance documents to meaningfully affect departments' and
agencies' NEPA processes. In sum, the NEPA guidance communicated to gov-
ernment actors that they should consider climate change when making major
decisions, and provided actionable recommendations on how departments and
agencies might do so.
4. Regulatory Oversightfor Nonclimate Regulations
The Obama Administration likely used centralized regulatory review at
OMB's OIRA to push agencies to account for climate change when weighing
the costs and benefits of regulations that did not directly involve environmental
policy. This expanded the traditional practice of regulatory cost-benefit analy-
132. Council on Envtl. Quality, White House Council on Environmental Quality Announces Steps
To Modernize and Reinvigorate the National Environmental Policy Act, EXECUTIVE OFF.
PRESIDENT (Feb. 18, 2010), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/ceq
/PressReleases/February_182010 [http://perma.cc/X3GV-Z69B].
133. Memorandum from Christina Goldfuss, supra note 11.
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id. at 33 n.86.
136. Id. at 33 & n.88.
137. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (2016).
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sis-which by some accounts had consistently undervalued environmental
costs and benefits - to incorporate climate change considerations.
The Obama Administration's use of regulatory review is part of a long his-
tory of presidential control over regulation. Modern regulatory review emerged
during the Reagan Administration with Executive Order 12,291.' Executive
Order 12,291 empowered OIRA to veto regulations and required agencies to
show that the benefits of new regulations would exceed their costs. At the time,
an expanding regulatory state had provoked a bacldash from regulated parties,
and antiregulatory sentiment was high. The Reagan Administration's "regula-
tory reformers" promoted cost-benefit analysis and centralized regulatory re-
view to introduce a deregulatory slant into the administrative state. Conse-
quently, many environmental advocates who sought greater regulatory protec-
protections came to revile cost-benefit analysis.` 9
This style of regulatory review persisted until the Clinton Administration,
which replaced Executive Order 12,291 with Executive Order 12,866. Executive
Order 12,866 imposed a softer requirement for cost-effectiveness: a rule's ben-
efits must justify, but not necessarily exceed, its costs. The Order also provided
greater room for agencies to consider qualitative and non-quantifiable factors
in decision making and promoted transparency by directing agencies to explain
any changes made to a regulation due to OIRA's recommendations.14 0 These
changes were intended to balance cost-benefit analysis and ameliorate its de-
regulatory bias. Consequently, some environmental groups gradually softened
their opposition to cost-benefit analysis and became regular participants in
cost-benefit driven regulatory processes.14 1
138. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981). The earliest efforts at regulatory oversight be-
gan in the Nixon Administration with a so-called "Quality of Life" review process super-
vised by OMB. Jim Tozzi, OIRA's Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regula-
tory Review Preceding OIRA's Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (2011). However, the
Nixon review process-in practice-ignored most agencies other than EPA. Id. at 48-49. The
Ford administration issued two executive orders -Executive Orders 11,821 and 11,949-
which required agencies to consider the economic and inflationary impacts of economically
significant regulations. However, these reviews were nonbinding. Id. at 51. The Carter ad-
ministration also advanced regulatory review with Executive Order 12,044, which imposed a
thicker requirement for regulatory impact analyses. Id. at 55-57. However, even in the Carter
era, the President did not have the power to strike regulations; ultimately, the final decision
to regulate remained with the agency.
139. RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 10 (2008).
140. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
141. REvEsz & LIVERMORE, supra note 139, at 33-45. In the last few decades, some environmental
groups - most notably the Environmental Defense Fund - grew to see cost-benefit analysis
as a beneficial tool for incorporating environmental concerns into administrative decision
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Although the George W. Bush Administration replaced Executive Order
12,866 with a more Reagan-like order for regulatory review,142 the Obama Ad-
ministration largely reinstated Executive Order 12,866 with Executive Order
13,563.143 Executive Order 13,563 slightly deviated from Executive Order 12,866
by emphasizing the use of sound scientific information and the quantification
of costs and benefits.144 Executive Order 13,563 indirectly referred to climate
change by incorporating a presidential "scientific integrity" memorandum that
identified climate change, energy efficiency, and environmental protection as
key areas of interest:
Science and the scientific process must inform and guide decisions of
my Administration on a wide range of issues, including improvement
of public health, protection of the environment, increased efficiency in
the use of energy and other resources, mitigation of the threat of cli-
mate change, and protection of national security.14 5
Although the memorandum did not require agencies to consider climate
change when conducting regulatory impact analyses, it singled out climate
change as a specific issue where scientific knowledge was important. This rep-
resented a marked departure from the George W. Bush Administrations con-
certed efforts to suppress and manipulate science that did not comport with its
policy objectives. 14 6
making. See, e.g., Frederic D. Krupp, New Environmentalism Factors in Economic Needs, WALL.
ST. J. (Nov. 20, 1986), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117269353475022375 [http://
perma.cc/888K-NJAQ] (describing how under the author's leadership, the Environmental
Defense Fund used cost-benefit analysis to advocate for pro-environmental goals).
142. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. § 191 (2008).
143. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 3821 (2011).
144. Summary of Executive Order 12866 - Regulatory Planning and Review, ENvTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-executive-order
-12866-regulatory-planning-and-review [http://perma.cc/23YV-54ZG].
145. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies (Mar. 9,
2009), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-heads
-executive-departments-and-agencies-3-9-09 [http://perma.cc/2D7W-FLYP].
146. This story is documented in a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists. Scientific Integri-
ty in Policymaking: Further Investigation of the Bush Administration's Misuse of Science, UNION
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (July 2004), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy
/assets/documents/scientific-integrity/scientific-integrity in policy making july2o04
1.pdf [http://perma.cc/A64Y-ZWGJ]. However, some scholars have painted a more mixed
picture for the state of scientific integrity in the Obama Administration. See, e.g., Heidi
Kitrosser, Scientific Integrity: The Perils and Promise of White House Administration, 79 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 2395, 2406-16 (2011) (criticizing the Obama Administration's approach to gov-
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Still, the overall effect of the Obama Administration's regulatory review on
environmental protection has been contested. The dispute has been headlined
by Professors Cass Sunstein and Lisa Heinzerling, who both served in the
Obama Administration. Heinzerling claimed that the Obama OIRA had
stonewalled environmental regulatory efforts, particularly an Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulation on tropospheric ozone pollution,147 by de-
liberately introducing delays into the OIRA review processl48 and serving as a
"pocket veto" for President Obama to stop meritorious but politically incon-
venient regulations.149 On the other hand, Sunstein claimed that the Obama
OIRA mostly served as a middleman agency and "information aggregator" that
gathered necessary information from the White House and other agencies to
promote improved decision making.so Sunstein attributed delays in the OIRA
process to difficulties inherent in this sort of interagency consultation. The res-
olution of this debate is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the Hein-
zerling-Sunstein debate neatly prefaces a key question: did President Obama
use centralized regulatory review to advance climate-consciousness?
This question is difficult to answer because OIRA is opaque."' During the
Obama Administration, OIRA moved toward even greater opacity by abandon-
ing the George W. Bush Administration's practice of issuing "return letters,"
letters that enumerate OIRA's reasons for rejecting regulatory actions and re-
turning them to agencies.152 Moreover, the two lines of evidence examined in
this Section provide a mixed picture.
ernment science during the BP oil spill and treatment of whistleblowers, but lauding the In-
terior Department's scientific integrity program).
147. See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider's Reflections on the Relationship Between the
Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 325, 354-58 (2014).
148. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Lisa Heinzerling Won't Back Down, GREENWIRE (May 27, 2014), http://
wvxw.eenews.net/stories/1o60000220 [http://perma.cc/9JSK-KCXW].
149. Molly Redden, Opinion, OIRA Antagonizing Environmentalists, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 12,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/12/145095539/new-republic-oira-antagonizing
-environmentalists [http://perma.cc/6VDB-RXZ4].
150. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 HAlv. L. REv. 1838, 1840-41 (2013).
151. Several observers have criticized OIRA for its opacity. For one recent account, see Peter L.
Strauss, The OIRA Transparency Problem, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov.
22, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-oira-transparency-problem-by-peter-strauss [http://
perma.cc/9FFH-UBU5].
152. Stuart Shapiro, Obama's Ozone Decision Shows Clearly Who's in Charge, REG. REv. (Sept.
8, 2011), http://www.theregreview.org/2o11/o9/o8/obamas-ozone-decision-shows-clearly
-whos-in-charge [http://perma.cc/2KCCE-ZH92] (noting that a 2011 return letter was the
first one sent by the Obama Administration over two-and-a-half years of regulatory activi-
ty); see also SECTION ON ADMIN. LAw & REGULATORY PRACTICE, AM. BAR Ass'N, IMPROVING
201
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
On the one hand, the Obama Administration relied heavily on cost-benefit
analyses to justify its expensive "first pillar" regulations like the Clean Power
Plan5 3 and "Phase 2" medium- and heavy-duty vehicle fuel efficiency stand-
ards,15 pointing to the high social costs of greenhouse gas emissions. Even os-
tensibly nonclimate-related rules relied on careful regulatory justifications of
environmental benefits. Consider the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards
(MATS), an expensive air toxics regulation that caused extensive retirements of
coal-fired power plants' and was portrayed by many as a stealth climate
change regulation.15 6 During litigation, the Obama Administration defended
MATS by pointing to a vast array of regulatory "co-benefits" that supplement-
ed the regulation's primary benefits."' Regulations like the Clean Power Plan
and MATS demonstrate that the Obama Administration very carefully used
cost-benefit analyses to justify stricter climate change regulations and defend
them from challenges.
On the other hand, I found mixed results in a review of regulatory impact
assessments (RIAs) associated with rules submitted to OIRA in 2007 and 2015
by six departments and agencies: EPA, the DOE, the Department of Interior,
the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT OF THE UNITED STATES 8
(2016) (exhorting the incoming administration to exercise openness and transparency in
OIRA review).
153. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (2015), http://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities riafinal-clean-power
-plan-exisfing-units_2ol5-o8.pdf [http://perma.cc/P9J4-4HV9].
154. Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards
for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles - Phase 2, Proposed Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PRO-
TECTION AGENCY & NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (2015), http://www
.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2o14-o827-o243 [http://perma.cc/3SKB
-BVKG].
155. EIA Electricity Generator Data Show Power Industry Response to EPA Mercury Limits, U.S. EN-
ERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 7, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26 9 7 2
[http://perma.cc/757F-VEFU].
156. See, e.g., Editorial, The EPA's War on jobs, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2011), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB100014240527487038182045762o6662079202844 [http://perma.cc/VM7M
-T6PX].
157. See Brief for Respondent at 14, 56-57, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46).
These co-benefits were primarily attributable to reductions in particulate emissions that oc-
curred as an incident of controlling mercury emissions. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Fi-
nal Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, at ES-1 (Dec. 2011),
http://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/5Q9D
-6FBH]; see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (reviewing the MATS regulation
and its cost-benefit analysis).
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the Department of Veterans Affairs. Due to various limitations,ss I was unable
to conduct a full-fledged analysis. Nevertheless, I reached two valuable qualita-
tive conclusions about the extent to which departments and agencies consid-
ered climate change in their RIAs.
First, even for regulations submitted to OIRA in 2015, the six federal de-
partments and agencies varied greatly in whether and how much they consid-
ered climate change in their RIAs. This variance appeared to correspond to
how much each agency's mission related to energy, environmental, and climate
change issues. The DOE and EPA took climate change very seriously in their
RIAs, consistently quantifying and monetizing emissions increases and reduc-
tions resulting from regulations." 9 The DOT considered climate change for
158. In this analysis, I attempted to code for the depth and extent of each agency's treatment of
climate change in their regulatory impact analyses. However, I was not able to define catego-
ries that accurately reflected agencies' consideration of climate change, and I was not able to
develop a satisfactory method for accounting for instances where agency consideration of
climate change was evident in agency documents other than the regulatory impact analysis.
Additionally, I often had trouble discerning what document actually constituted the
agency's RIA, and what set of documents was actually submitted to OIRA for review. There-
fore, the assessment that follows is necessarily rough, and I caution against drawing strong
conclusions from it.
159. As expected, the DOE and EPA engaged in extensive analyses of climate change-related ben-
efits and costs. Nine of ten energy efficiency regulations proposed by DOE and reviewed by
OIRA contained a monetization of climate benefits; the tenth contained a quantification of
avoided emissions but not a monetization of benefits. For the nine rules, see Office of Ener-
gy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Technical Support Document: Energy Efficiency Program for
Consumer Products and Commercial and Industrial Equipment: Commercial Warm Air Furnaces,
U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EERE-2o13
-BT-STD-oo21-oo12 [http://perma.cc/2GUE-R6F7]; Office of Energy Efficiency & Renew-
able Energy, Technical Support Document: Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products:
Energy Conservation Standards for Hearth Products, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EERE-2o14-BT-STD-oo36-ooo2 [http://perma
.cc/2WB6-A7VU]; Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Technical Support Doc-
ument: Energy Efficiency Program for Consumer Products and Commercial and Industrial Equip-
ment: Residential Boilers, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov
/document?D=EERE-2o12-BT-STD-oo4 7 -oo36 [http://perma.cc/BPTS-FXRE]; Office of
Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Technical Support Document: Energy Efficiency Pro-
gram for Consumer Products and Commercial and Industrial Equipment: Residential Furnaces,
U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (Feb. 10 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EERE-2o14
-BT-STD-oo31-oo2 7 [http://perma.cc/H3GW-NWWS]; Office of Energy Efficiency & Re-
newable Energy, Technical Support Document: Energy Efficiency Program for Consumer Products
and Commercial and Industrial Equipment: Residential Conventional Ovens, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY
(May 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EERE-2o14-BT-STD-ooo5-ool8
[http://perma.cc/8YVP-NCG8]; Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Technical
Support Document: Energy Efficiency Program for Consumer Products and Commercial and Indus-
trial Equipment: Pumps, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (Dec. 2015), http://www.regulations.gov
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/document?D=EERE-2o11-BT-STD-oo31-oo56 [http://perma.cc/FB28-NDKN]; Office of
Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Technical Support Document: Energy Efficiency Pro-
gram for Consumer Products and Commercial and Industrial Equipment: Refrigerated Bottled or
Canned Beverage Vending Machines, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www
.regulations.gov/document?D=EERE-2o13-BT-STD-oo22-oo67 [http://perma.cc/G6Z2
-T4VF]; Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Technical Support Document: En-
ergy Efficiency Program for Consumer Products and Commercial and Industrial Equipment: Resi-
dential Dehumidifiers, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (June 2016), http://www.regulations.gov
/document?D=EERE-2o12-BT-STD-oo2 7 -oo46 [http://perma.cc/LHJ9-K8RJ]; and Office
of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Technical Support Document: Energy Efficiency Pro-
gram for Consumer Products and Commercial and Industrial Equipment: Ceiling Fans, U.S.
DEP'T ENERGY (NOV. 2016), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EERE-2o12-BT
-STD-oo45 -o149 [http://perma.cc/4PKJ-FN5J].
For the tenth DOE rule, see Energy Efficiency Standards for New Federal Commercial
and Multi-Family High-Rise Residential Buildings' Baseline Standards Update, So Fed.
Reg. 68749, 68755 (Nov. 6, 2015).
The EPA considered climate change extensively in its air pollution regulations, which
made up nearly two-thirds of its actions that were reviewed by OIRA. In addition to consid-
ering climate change in its explicitly climate-focused air pollution regulations like the Clean
Power Plan, EPA monetized the value of incidental methane regulations that occurred along
with municipal solid waste landfill regulations aimed at other pollutants; described and val-
ued the increased emissions resulting from a regulation for air toxics from brick, structural
clay, and clay ceramics manufacturing; and even tried to assess the climate consequences of
black carbon soot from residential wood heaters and furnaces, notwithstanding that the cli-
mate consequences of black carbon soot were ill-understood by the agency. See Draft Regula-
tory Impact Analysis (RIA), Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standardsfor Medium-
and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles - Phase 2, Proposed Rule, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY & NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (June 2015), http://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2o14-o827-o243 [http://perma.cc/3R7G-NYP7]; Regula-
tory Impact Analysis: Final Brick and Structural Clay Products NESHAP, U.S. ENvTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY (July 2011), http://www3.epa.gov/ttnecasi/docs/ria/nonmetallic-mineralria
final-brick-neshap_2015-07.pdf [http://perma.cc/L8SY-KDMM]; Regulatory ImpactAnaly-
sis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Oct. 23, 2015),
http://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities riafinal-clean-power-plan-existing-units
-2015-o8.pdf [http://perma.cc/S424-QUYQ]; Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Re-
visions to the Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources and Supplemental Proposed New Source
Performance Standards in the Municipal Solid Waste Landfills Sector, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (Aug. 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2o03-0215
-0135 [http://perma.cc/B33W-6ZX9]; Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for Residential Wood
Heaters NSPS Revision: Final Report, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Feb. 2015), http://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0734-1789 [http://perma.cc
/BB5C-4 7 SH].
I did not find climate change considered in non-air regulations by the EPA during this
period; however, the sample size is too small to understand whether this is a systematic
problem or an incident of the few actions that happened to come before OIRA during this
period. The EPA's internal guidelines for cost-benefit analysis make note of greenhouse gas-
es and climate change-related costs and benefits, suggesting that there is an agency-wide
priority on including climate change in cost-benefit analyses. Office of Policy, Guidelines for
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regulations involving its physical assets, where the agency was concerned about
climate-resilient infrastructure.16 0 Interior, Agriculture, and Veterans Affairs
were less attentive to climate change, ignoring climate change even for rules
that clearly appeared to implicate climate change.161 This variance suggests that
the Obama Administration either did not promote climate-consciousness
through OIRA regulatory review at all, or that the Obama Administration's
Preparing Economic Analyses, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 17, 2010), http://
yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-o568-5o.pdf/$file/EE-o568-5o.pdf [http://
perma.cc/65BZ-3MMC].
16o. The Department of Transportation (DOT) identified climate change as a key area of risk for
its "Asset Management Plan," but did not elaborate greatly. An Analysis of the Economic and
Non-Economic Costs and Benefits of Implementing MAP-21 Asset Management Plans and Related
Provisions, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP. (2015), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FHWA
-2013-0052-0001 [http://perma.cc/JB4G-67TY]. In a pipeline infrastructure rule that in-
volved methane releases, the DOT also fully monetized the benefits of methane leakage pre-
vention. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., Regulatory Impact Analysis: Pipe-
line Safety: Expanding the Use of Excess Flow Valves in Gas Distribution Systems to Applications
Other than Single-Family Residences, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP. (Oct. 2016), http://www
.regulations.gov/document?D=PHMSA-2011-0009-0049 [http://perma.cc/7J66-7AXH]. It
appears that for the set of DOT rules that have major climate change implications, DOT -at
the very least -describes climate change risks and monetizes mitigated emissions.
161. The Department of Veterans Affairs did not mention climate change at all in its RIAs, even
though some regulatory actions- most notably an update to a "Caregivers Program" that
implicated substantial numbers of vehicle miles traveled-had obvious climate change-
related implications. Memorandum from Chief Impact Analyst, Office of Gen. Counsel, U.S.
Dep't of Veterans Affairs, to Dir., Regulations Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs (Oct. 31,
2014), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=VA-2014-VHA-0022-0002 [http://perma
.cc/6LBX-ME52]. The Department of Interior was similarly inattentive to climate change.
For example, in an RIA relating to a rule about stimulation of oil and gas wells -an activity
that can lead to substantial direct emissions as well as downstream emissions -the Depart-
ment of Interior made no mention of climate change. Well Stimulation Proposed Rule: Eco-
nomic Analysis and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, U.S. BuREAu LAND MGMT. (2012),
http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BLM-2012-ooo1-ooo3 [http://perma.cc/M5C9
-APMK]. In regulations about the hunting of migratory birds, the Department again made
no mention of how climate change may affect migratory birds. Division of Econ., Economic
Analysis of the Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations for the 2013-2014 Season, FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV. (Aug. 2013), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0o64
-0011 [http://perma.cc/C2VF-42T3].
As for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department made cursory
mentions of carbon sequestration with respect to conservation easements. However, USDA
made no attempt to quantify or monetize these associated benefits. Farm Serv. Agency, Cost-
Benefit Assessment: Conservation Reserve Program Interim Rule, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. (June 18,
2015), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CCC-2015-ooo6-0002 [http://perma.cc
/5LILX-HPPC]; Nat. Res. Conservation Serv., Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Agriculture
Conservation Easement Program, U.S. DEP'T AGRIc. (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=NRCS-2014-ooll-ooo5 [http://perma.cc/5HJS-QXPG].
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effort was imperfect and only reached agencies that were already susceptible to
climate-consciousness.
Second, even for regulations submitted to OIRA for review in 2007, climate
change was not entirely absent from RIAs. The Department of Energy (DOE)
made particularly ambitious efforts to quantify emissions reductions in its en-
ergy efficiency regulations, making such assessments in four of five RIAs for
2007.162 In fact, the RIA for one regulation attempted to monetize emissions
reductions,163 a difficult task given high uncertainty about the social cost of
greenhouse gas emissions at the time.164 Considering that the George W. Bush
Administration was noted for its suppression of climate science,16 these RIAs
suggest that imperfect presidential control permitted professional staff in the
DOE to continue considering climate change when estimating regulatory ben-
efits. This gestures towards the possibility that, even under President Trump,
agencies may continue to consider climate change in measuring costs and ben-
efits.
The analysis in this Section leaves an unclear picture. Although Sunstein
and others have publicly stated that embedding climate change in cost-benefit
analyses was a key priority for the Obama Administration,16 6 agencies under
the Obama Administration appear to have varied greatly in the depth and ex-
tent to which they considered climate change. Yet the Obama Administration's
use of cost-benefit analyses to justify its climate change regulations suggests
162. For the four rules that make such a quantification, see Energy Conservation Standards for
Certain Consumer Products, 74 Fed. Reg. 16040, 16078-80 (Apr. 8, 2009); Energy Conser-
vation Program for Commercial and Industrial Equipment, 74 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 (Jan. 6,
2009); Environmental Assessment for Today's Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Fur-
naces and Boilers, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (Sept. 2007), http://www.regulations.gov
/document?D=EERE-20o6-STD-0102-0211 [http://perma.cc/BK2W-YXA8]; and Energy
Conservation Standards for New Federal Commercial and Multi-Family High-Rise Resi-
dential Buildings and New Federal Low-Rise Residential Buildings, 71 Fed. Reg. 70275,
70280 (Dec. 4,20o6).
For the rule that did not consider climate change, see Regulatory Impact Analysis for En-
ergy Conservation Standards for Distribution Transformers, U.S. DEP'T ENERGY (July 2007),
http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EERE-20o6-STD-oo99-o252 [http://perma.cc
/66XN-XEFZ].
163. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Certain Consumer
Products, 74 Fed. Reg. at 16078-80.
164. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Michael Greenstone & Cass R. Sunstein, Donald Trump Should Know: This Is What
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that the Obama Administration was at least cognizant of the relationship be-
tween cost-benefit analyses and climate-consciousness. Moreover, as argued in
the next Section, the Obama Administration expended substantial effort on sci-
entific tools to facilitate the consideration of climate change in cost-benefit
analyses. On balance, Obama Administration likely used OIRA- at least to
some extent - as part of the "fourth pillar."
The varying degree to which agencies considered climate change in cost-
benefit analyses suggests that some agencies were more prepared than others to
consider climate change in regulatory design and policy analyses. Agencies
needed scientific tools and resources to lower the analytical burden associated
with climate-consciousness. The next Section argues that the Obama Admin-
istration attempted to provide such resources by expanding the scope of policy-
relevant government science on climate change.
5. Authoritative Scientific Resources
The Obama Administration greatly expanded the scope of government cli-
mate change research and protected the integrity of scientific processes, shift-
ing from the Bush Administration's practice of discouraging and interfering
with climate science. 167
The Obama Administration promoted many different climate change re-
search programs, ranging from the impacts of climate change on individual
specieS 168 to large-scale assessments of the United States' vulnerability to cli-
mate change. This Section focuses on two of these programs - the National
Climate Assessment (NCA) process by the U.S. Global Change Research Pro-
gram (GCRP) and estimates of the social cost of carbon (SCC) by the Inter-
agency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon (IWG-SCC). Both pro-
jects produced useful information that aided government agencies in climate-
conscious governance, supporting the Obama Administration's broader climate
change efforts. Moreover, both programs underline the extent to which the
167. This was discussed briefly in the discussion of "scientific integrity" in the previous Section.
See supra text accompanying notes 145-146. For example, in 20o6, Dr. James Hansen-then-
director of NASA's Goddard Institute -spoke out against the Bush Administration's sup-
pression of climate scientists in a highly publicized article in the New York Times. Andrew C.
Revkin, Climate Expert Says NASA Tried To Silence Him, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 20o6), http://
www.nytimes.com/2oo6/ol/29/science/earth/climate-expert-says-nasa-tried-to-silence
-him.html [http://perma.cc/SGW4-6RNN].
168. See, e.g., Alaska Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Pritzker, 84o F.3 d 671, 676-79 (9 th Cir. 2016) (detailing
government scientists' work to determine whether a species of seal would be vulnerable to
extinction due to future climatic conditions).
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Obama Administration's fourth pillar leveraged and relied on scientific and
technical expertise.
The Obama Administration breathed life into the dormant NCA program.
In 1990, Congress passed the Global Change Research Act,16 9 which estab-
lished the GCRP and charged it with conducting "assessments every four years
that 'analyze[] current trends in global change."'1 70 After a hiatus during the
George W. Bush Administration, a federal district court in 2007 issued a man-
damus order for the GCRP to conduct its statutorily mandated assessments.1 7 1
Following this order, the GCRP in 2009 issued the Second NCA after a trun-
cated two-year production process. 172 Although the Assessment-at over 18o
pages long-provided a sound overview of climate change impacts in the Unit-
ed States, the Third NCA, released in 2014, dwarfed the Second NCA.1 7 ' The
Third NCA, Climate Change Impacts in the United States, required "a three-year
analytical effort by a team of over 300 experts." 174 The Third NCA was the
product of a range of expert bodies, including the National Research Council
(NRC) and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). That broad consultative
effort "establish[ed] a strong base that government at all levels of U.S. society
can use in responding" to the demands of climate change.1 7 1
The Third NCA provided detailed sector-specific projections of climate im-
pacts, thorough assessments of how climate change would affect activities in
different regions, and a rough assessment of how different climate policies
would mesh together. The breadth of the Third NCA reflected the Obama
Administration's strong support for the GCRP: President Obama increased
GCRP funding by forty-five percent over eight years 176 despite attacks from
169. Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 3096 (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921-2691(2012)).
170. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 4o6 F. Supp. 2d 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 2936(3) (2000)).
171. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
172. Thomas R. Karl et al., Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States, U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RES. PROGRAM (2009), http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs
/climate-impacts-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/T7Q9-5QVZ].
173. Jerry M. Melillo et al., Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Cli-
mate Assessment, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE REs. PROGRAM (2014), http://s3.amazonaws.com
/nca2ol4/low/NCA3_ClimateChangeImpacts-in the United%2oStatesLowRes.pdf
[http://perma.cc/MDE8-SV2Q].
174. Id. at iii.
175. Id.
176. Flavelle, supra note lo9.
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Republican members of Congress.1 7 7 The Obama Administration also took se-
rious steps to publicize the release of the Third NCA, organizing interviews in
the Rose Garden between President Obama and major news organizations' me-
teorologists to bring attention to the NCA's findings.1 7 ' Following the release
of the Third NCA, the Obama Administration continued to support the GCRP
by supporting the drafting process for the Fourth NCA.1 7 9 The Fourth NCA
process continued to build upon the Third NCA by compiling greater research
on the relationship between climate change and human health and developing
even more regionally tailored information for decisionmakers.so By providing
the NCA process with resources and protecting it from political interference,
the Obama Administration was able to put scientific, technical, and economic
expertise at the fore, producing accurate and useful information that both jus-
tified and facilitated climate-consciousness for decisionmakers both within and
without government.
In addition to these broad national assessments, the Obama Administration
commissioned studies to address narrower issues."' Perhaps the most im-
portant effort involved the SCC, an estimate of the present value of the social
cost associated with each marginal unit of carbon dioxide emissions. The SCC
is important for climate-consciousness because it allows agencies to estimate
the monetary value of increased or reduced carbon emissions, allowing them to
project the long-term effects of climate change in their cost-benefit analyses.
As documented by Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner, early attempts to esti-
mate the SCC led to poorly constrained results, with estimates that ranged be-
177. See, e.g., Michael Bastasch, Rand Paul Slams Obama for Wasting Billions on Duplicative Global
Warming Research, DAILY CAILER (Apr. 25, 2016, 5:44 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2o16/o4
/25/rand-paul-slams-obama-for-wasting-billions-on-duplicative-global-warming-research
[http://perma.cc/BW85-MZZR] (hailing Senator Rand Paul's opposition to climate change
research funding).
178. Andrew Freedman, Obama Taps TV Meteorologists To Roll Out New Climate Report,
MAsHABLE (May 5, 2014), http://mashable.com/2o14/o5/o5/white-house-climate-report
-meterologists [http://perma.cc/L4D9-NFJG].
179. As one marker of this support, during the final weeks of the Obama Administration, the
White House released a draft of the Fourth NCA and explained the state of the GCRP's re-
search efforts. Tamara Dickinson & Michael Kuperberg, Providing the Foundation for the




181. See, e.g., Patricia K. Quinn et al., AMAP Assessment 2o15: Black Carbon and Ozone as Arctic
Climate Forcers, ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRMMME (2015), http://wwW.amap
.no/documents/download/25o6 [http://perma.cc/XA8L-XN2G].
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tween $o and $68 per ton of carbon dioxide emissions.182 This meant that fed-
eral agencies struggled to place a value on emissions increases or reductions
when evaluating their decisions. Consequently, the Obama OMB in 2009 con-
vened the IWG-SCC, which derived an authoritative SCC figure that federal
agencies could use in regulatory processes. 18
The IWG-SCC's valuation model relied on three common integrated as-
sessment models (IAMs) for climate change, undergirded by relatively simple
macroeconomic models. The IAMs estimated greenhouse gas emissions as a
function of economic growth and the expected carbon intensity of economic
output.184 The resulting estimates were monetized into social costs by applying
functions for the effects of emissions on global temperature and the effects of
global temperature changes on climate-induced damage to society.' The
IWG-SCC's model produced a shadow price for carbon that stretched four dec-
ades into the future. 18 6 Notably, the IWG-SCC declined to specify an appropri-
ate discount rate for climate-induced costs and benefits,"' sidestepping a con-
tentious scholarly debate about such discount rates. 8
Of course, as Masur and Posner observe, the IWG-SCC's methodology was
flawed in many respects.'" First, the IWG-SCC's method produced a global
182. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1560-61 (2011).
183. EPA Fact Sheet: Social Cost of Carbon, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 2015), http://
www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2o16/capandtradel6/attachil.pdf [http://perma.cc/VQE3-46TJ].
184. Masur & Posner, supra note 182, at 1578.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1579.
187. Id.
M88. There is a robust debate in the economics literature. Economists generally wrestle over the
so-called "Ramsey equation," which attempts to account for returns on capital, risk aversion,
and pure rates of time preference. The most famous controversy erupted in the late 2000S
between Lord Nicholas Stern and William Nordhaus. See generally William D. Nordhaus, A
Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE
686 (2007) (responding to Lord Stern).
Of course, there is a closely related debate in the non-economic literature about dis-
counting, including a controversy as to whether discounting is justifiable at all. See David
Leonhardt, A Battle over the Costs of Global Warming, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 21, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/business/21leonhardt.html [http://perma.cc/2N7H
-FUTM]; Will Oremus, How Much Is the Future Worth?, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Sept. 1,
2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future-tense/2o17/o9/how-social
-discounting helps-explain why we don t preparefordisasters.html [http://perma.cc
/RC6F-5FTS].
189. Masur & Posner, supra note 182, at 1580-88.
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SCC-which accounted for the social cost imposed by domestic emissions on
all countries instead of only the United States - raising questions about the rel-
evant measurement of damages. 9 o Second, the IWG-SCC's underlying models
relied on relatively simple and optimistic assumptions that overlooked the pos-
sibility of catastrophic consequences of climate change."' This concern has
been rendered more salient by recent studies suggesting that catastrophic cli-
mate impacts may be highly correlated,1 92 enhancing the right-skewed "fat-
tailedness" of the risk distribution for climate change. 93 Third, the IWG-
SCC's method assumed that climate change decision making should apply a
principle of risk-neutrality, not risk-averseness.1 94 The flaws with the IWG-
SCC were potentially serious, leading to the possible under- or overestimation
of the social cost of carbon.
The IWG-SCC's model was nevertheless useful to agencies because it pro-
vided a reasonable SCC figure that removed the burden of estimation from
agencies and aggregated authoritative scientific knowledge. Federal agencies,
19o. Id. at 1588.
191. Id. at 158o-85. For example, recent studies have raised severe concerns about a possible shut-
down of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), a large-scale ocean cur-
rent that moves heat from Earth's equatorial regions to its poles. See, e.g., Ruth Curry &
Cecilie Mauritzen, Dilution of the Northern North Atlantic Ocean in Recent Decades, 308 SC-
ENCE 1772 (2005); James Hansen et al., Ice Melt, Sea-Level Rise and Superstorms: Evidence from
Paleoclimate Data, Climate Modeling, and Modern Observations that 20C Global Warming Could
Be Dangerous, 16 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 3761 (2016) (using multiple lines of
evidence to argue, in part, that a shutdown of the AMOC is more likely than commonly
thought); Wei Liu et al., Overlooked Possibility of a Collapsed Atlantic Meridional Overturning
Circulation in Warming Climate, SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 4, 2017, at 1 (applying a revised ice melt
model to study the possibility of an AMOC shutdown).
192. See, e.g., Yongyang Cai et al., Risk of Multiple Interacting Tipping Points Should Encourage
Rapid C02 Emissions Reduction, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 520 (2016), http://www.nature
.com/nclimate/joumal/v6/n5/pdf/nclimate2964.pdf [http://perma.cc/3DM9-K2XJ] (ad-
vocating for policymakers to thoroughly consider the possibility of tipping points that are
highly correlated with each other).
193. Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate
Change, 91 REV. ECON. STAT. 1, 2 (2009) (arguing that the "extreme-negative-impact fat tail"
of the probability density function for climate change damages should counsel policymakers
to treat climate change as a policy problem akin to insuring against a catastrophic risk, not
as a problem of smoothing consumption over time subject to a discount rate); id. at 5-6 (ex-
trapolating upon the highly uncertain social damages that could be imposed by extreme
global warming); id. at 10-13 (describing a "dismal theorem," where a public problem like
climate change may lead to unlimited risk exposure). But see William D. Nordhaus, An
Analysis of the Dismal Theorem 8-16 (Cowles Found., Working Paper No. 1686, 2009) (cri-
tiquing the assumptions that undergird Weitzman's "dismal theorem").
194. Masur & Posner, supra note 182, at 1581.
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most notably departments like DOE that had previously struggled to establish
and justify a SCC figure,"' made liberal use of the IWG-SCC's estimates.1 96
Further, as discussed in Section II.A and Part IV, the IWG-SCC's estimates
survived judicial scrutiny and meshed well with federal courts' demands for
economically rigorous regulatory analyses. Despite its flaws, courts trusted the
IWG-SCC's estimates as a good-faith effort that was untainted by political in-
terference, again underlining the importance of the Obama Administration's
respect for scientific, technical, and economic knowledge.
In sum, the Obama Administration encouraged serious and policy-relevant
scientific efforts. This accorded with the Obama White House's general treat-
ment of government science as a foundation for evidence-informed decisions,
not as a tool that provided a veneer of rationality for politically motivated
judgments. This insistence on scientific integrity responded to a judicial de-
mand for rigorous and politically untainted agency reasoning about climate
change and contradicted Congress's unscientific denial of climate change. Con-
sequently, the Trump Administration may find it difficult to repudiate efforts
advanced by the Obama Administration if pro-environmental litigants invoke
Obama-era government science to defend climate-conscious policies.197
6. Defense Planning
The Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Armed Forces have exhibited
a mature form of climate-consciousness, which demonstrates that climate-
consciousness is strengthened not only by scientific effort but also by repeated
practice. Deeply ingrained climate-consciousness in the defense community
preceded the Obama Administration, continued to develop during the Obama
presidency," and-as discussed in Section IV.C-has persisted into the Trump
presidency. Yet the DOD and U.S. Armed Forces are also special areas of the
federal government where presidential control is at its strongest, raising the
possibility that a tension will emerge between a well-established culture of cli-
mate-consciousness and a climate-unconscious Commander-in-Chief.
195. See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 159.
197. See infra Section W.B.
198. See, e.g., Danny Vinik, Why the GOP Is Trying To Stop the Pentagon's Climate Plan, POLITICO
(June 23, 2016, 5:21 AM), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2o16/o6/republicans
-trying-to-stop-pentagon-climate-plan-ooo49 [http://perma.cc/HNQ5-MGFM] (noting
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The DOD and U.S. Armed Forces were early movers on climate change. As
early as 1990, the Naval War College studied the impacts of climate change on
naval infrastructure and operations.' 99 By 2003, the DOD had begun to study
the security implications of extreme climate change scenarios.2 00 This approach
continued into the Obama Administration. In 2008, the DOD included climate
change in its National Defense Strategy,2 01 and in 2010, the DOD spent much
of its Quadrennial Defense Review discussing the implications of climate
change, describing it as an "accelerant of instability or conflict."202 A 2014
speech delivered by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to announce the DOD's
"Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap" illustrated the military's outlook on
climate change:
Climate change is a "threat multiplier" . . . because it has the potential
to exacerbate many of the challenges we already confront today - from
infectious disease to armed insurgencies -and to produce new chal-
lenges in the future ....
[C]limate trends will clearly have implications for our militaries. A
higher tempo and intensity of natural disasters could demand more
support for our civil authorities, and more humanitarian assistance and
relief. Our coastal installations could be vulnerable to rising shorelines
and flooding, and extreme weather could impair our training ranges,
supply chains, and critical equipment. Our militaries' readiness could
be tested, and our capabilities could be stressed.203
By this time, the military's focus had long moved beyond preparing facili-
ties and equipment for the impacts of climate change. The DOD and U.S.
199. Terry P. Kelley, Global Climate Change: Implications for the United States Navy, U.S. NAVAL
WAR C. 9-25 (May 1990), http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather
/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf [http://perma.cc/P4SY-Q64Q].
200. Peter Schwartz & Doug Randall, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for
United States National Security, CAL. INST. TECH. JET PROPULSION LAB (Oct. 2003), http://
oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA469325 [http://
perma.cc/AUF5-9M6S].
201. National Defense Strategy, U.S. DEP'T DEF. 5 (2008), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs
/2008NationalDefenseStrategy.pdf [http://perma.cc/SQ2L-GZAS].
202. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, U.S. DEP'T DEF. 85 (2010), http://www.defense.gov
/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR as-of 29JANio_16oo.pdf [http://perma
.cc/U9RX-YJ5N].
203. Chuck Hagel, U.S. Sec'y of Def., Speech at Conference of the Defense Ministers of the
Americas (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspxSpeechlD=1893
[http://perma.cc/5BBY-VDCV].
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Armed Forces had come to see climate change as a key strategic issue -even in-
corporating climate change into the curricula of military academies.2 04 A 2015
DOD response to a congressional inquiry revealed that most of the U.S. mili-
tary's combatant commands had already started to integrate climate change in-
to their training, planning, engagement with foreign forces, data analyses, and
disaster response planning.2 05 By the end of President Obama's second term,
there was a growing recognition among the administration's national security
and foreign policy officials that climate change contributed to the Syrian Civil
War20 6 and the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria,20 7 further heightening climate-
consciousness in the Pentagon.
Although the DOD and U.S. Armed Forces were deeply engaged with cli-
mate change before President Obama's tenure, the Obama Administration con-
tinued to advance the issue. The Obama Administration underscored the im-
portance of climate change with directives like the 2015 National Security
Strategy208 and the 2016 presidential memorandum on "Climate Change and
National Security;"209 established a "Climate and National Security Working
Group" to promote interagency cooperation on climate change issues across the
DOD, the intelligence community, and the military;2 1 0 and subjected the Pen-
204. Ian Duncan, For Naval Academy, Climate Change Is a Challenge Both Global and Local, BALT.
SUN (July 17, 2017, 9:13 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-naval
-climate-change-20150717-story.html [http://perma.cc/8QHZ-FE6L].
205. National Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate, U.S. DEP'T
DEF. (July 23, 2015), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/150724-congressional-report-on
-national-implications-of-climate-change.pdf [http://perma.cc/VR6U-772H].
2o6. See, e.g., Climate Change Intensifies Conflicts, John Kerry Says, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 11, 2015),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/kerry-political-crises-linked-climate-change
-151110190932931.html [http://perma.cc/ZU6Y-CXDC]; Dan Merica, Hillary Clinton:
Climate Change Has Contributed to Refugee Crises, Including Syria, CNN (Nov. 4, 2015,
12:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/04/politics/hillary-clinton-climate-change-syria-
refugee-crises [http://perma.cc/5y93-Y6FE]; see also John Wendle, The Ominous Story of
Syria's Climate Refugees, Scl. AM. (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article
/ominous-story-of-syria-climate-refugees [http://perma.cc/X3LT-YBMG] (explaining how
climate change exacerbated civil unrest).
207. Climate Change Intensifies Conflicts, John Kerry Says, supra note 206.
208. The 2o15 National Security Strategy, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2015), http://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2os1national-security strategy_2.pdf [http://perma
.cc/M7 XA-XXDD].
209. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies (Sept.
21, 2016), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2o16/o9/21/presidential-
memorandum-climate-change-and-national-security [http://perma.cc/L7QT-C2SB].
210. Id.; Lynne Howard, Obama Presidential Memorandum Sought To Embed Climate Change Im-
pacts into National Security Planning, 42 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 1-5 (2017).
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tagon to its climate-related executive orders. Together, these actions amplified
climate-consciousness in the military bureaucracy and instilled the White
House's vision of climate-conscious decision making.
More importantly, the DOD was receptive. For example, the Pentagon in
January 2016 issued Directive 4715.21, "Climate Change Adaptation and Resili-
ence," as a direct response to President Obama's orders on climate change adap-
tation and resilience.211 Although the Directive "received little coverage when it
was first published," some military experts believed that the Directive took "a
critical step toward streamlining" the DOD's climate preparedness initiatives by
establishing a clear chain of command and allocating responsibilities for cli-
mate responses.2 12 In other words, the Directive ensured that the DOD's cli-
mate change initiatives progressed in a structured and organized fashion.
As climate-consciousness has advanced in the Pentagon and U.S. Armed
Forces, leaders have realized both climate-related and nonclimate-related bene-
fits. For example, the Navy's emissions reductions initiative is expected to re-
duce its vulnerability to disruptions in fossil fuel supply chains and its bases'
vulnerability to cyberattacks against electrical grids. The Navy's effort to adapt
to a melting Arctic Ocean by building additional icebreakers is expected to en-
hance the Navy's ability to serve as a geopolitical counterweight to Russia.213 in
this manner, climate-consciousness may serve as a self-reinforcing phenome-
non once it reaches a critical point, as decisionmakers themselves begin to un-
derstand the importance of climate-consciousness.
Thus, President Obama inherited a DOD and U.S. Armed Forces that had
already started to take climate change seriously and encouraged them to con-
tinue. The defense community-more than any other part of government-
embodied a highly developed form of climate-consciousness formed through
years of practice, in which decisionmakers accepted and considered climate
change as a key issue for both long-term strategies and day-to-day operations.
The DOD and U.S. Armed Forces, then, may demonstrate that climate-
consciousness - once instilled - may simply become regularized practice.
211. DOD Directive 4715.21: Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience, U.S. DEP'T DEF. (2016),
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/471521p.pdf [http://perma.cc/XG3Y
-J3QX].
212. Vinik, supra note 198.
213. See Forest L. Reinhardt & Michael W. Toffel, Managing Climate Change: Lessons from the U.S.
Navy, HARV. Bus. REv. (July-Aug. 2017), http://hbr.org/2017/o7/managing-climate-change
[http://perma.cc/96UF-XK8X].
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D. The Fourth Pillar: A Novel Aggregation of Presidential Tools
President Obama's fourth pillar, viewed as an interconnected whole, was
remarkable for employing a broad array of tools. Three important trends may
be derived from this Part's descriptive account of these tools.
First, and perhaps most importantly, President Obama's fourth pillar was
deeply reliant on sound scientific, technical, and economic information. As not-
ed in Section I.C. 5 , the Obama Administration heavily supported government
research into climate change, and as noted in Section I.C.4, President Obama
made clear - from the first months of his presidency - that administrative deci-
sion making should respect scientific integrity. This emphasis on science was
evident even in President Obama's personal approach to grappling with climate
change. In an interview about climate change near the end of his presidency, he
demonstrated granular knowledge and deep thinking about climate change and
noted his particular interest in climate data presented by his science advisor,
John Holdren.2 14 This rigorous approach to dealing with climate change, which
was reflected at the highest levels of the Obama Administration, was reflected
in all aspects of the fourth pillar and was consonant with a judicial demand for
reasoned and technically sound administration.
Second, the Obama Administration's fourth pillar placed a heavy emphasis
on bottom-up implementation in response to top-down presidential directives
and incentives. From a top-down perspective, the fourth pillar issued binding
mandates enforced through centralized regulatory and budgetary oversight.
From a bottom-up perspective, the fourth pillar encouraged departments and
agencies to develop their own sustainability plans, seek funding for climate
change efforts with billions of dollars of appropriations concealed in the federal
budget, assess the environmental impacts of their actions through NEPA, and
apply government science to pursue more sustainable outcomes. This moderate
approach reflects a delicate balance between controlling and co-opting agen-
cies, reflecting the Obama Administration's objective of embedding climate-
consciousness throughout executive-branch practice instead of treating it as a
purely presidential priority. As demonstrated by the DOD, U.S. Armed Forces,
and the DOE, this sort of bottom-up climate-consciousness may be more re-
sistant to changes in political leadership. Moreover, such bottom-up buy-in
may be necessary given the sheer vastness of the federal bureaucracy relative to
the President's powers of presidential administration.
Third, the Obama Administration's fourth pillar exhibited a mixed record
on transparency. The Obama Administration's approach to centralized regula-
214. Davis et al., supra note 20.
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tory review, for example, was even more opaque than that of previous Presi-
dents.2 15 The Obama OMB obscured climate change initiatives with budgetary
machinations.216 By contrast, the Obama Administration was surprisingly
transparent about its efforts to further integrate climate change planning in the
national security context: President Obama217 and other senior administration
officials2 1 extensively used their bully pulpits to draw public attention to cli-
mate-and-security issues. This selective publicization of the national security
consequences of climate change may have reflected the Obama Administration's
awareness of the deep partisan polarization on climate change,2 19 as well as the
hope that a national security-oriented framing would be persuasive in convey-
ing the seriousness of climate change.220 Yet as discussed in Part III, the fourth
pillar may have been insulated from political pressure due to its low political
salience and not its selective opacity.
As observed throughout this Note, the fourth pillar was complex and var-
ied, but it was remarkably consistent in its emphasis on scientific, technical,
and economic knowledge. As discussed in the next Part, these persistent attrib-
utes of the fourth pillar answered a judicial demand for high-quality adminis-
trative reasoning on climate change, which provided room for the Obama Ad-
ministration to instill climate-consciousness and may protect climate-
consciousness from politicized interference under the Trump Administration.
II. A JUDICIAL DEMAND FOR SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY
The previous Part argued that President Obama's fourth pillar protected
scientific integrity and promoted scientific efforts. This Part briefly explains
215. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 109-110.
217. Susan Jones, Obama at West Point: "Effort To Combat Climate Change ... Will Help Shape
Your Time in Uniform," CNS NEws (May 29, 2014, 7:24 AM), http://www.cnsnews.com
/news/article/susan-jones/obama-west-point-effort-combat-climate-changewill-help-shape
-your-time [http://perma.cc/WXU4-ARM2].
218. Steve Almasy, John Kerry: Climate Change as Big a Threat as Terrorism, Poverty, WMDs, CNN
(Feb. 17, 2014, 8:42 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/16/politics/kerry-climate [http://
perma.cc/NLD2-URPQ].
219. See Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, The Politics of Climate, PEw RES. CTR. (Oct. 4, 2016),
http://www.pewintemet.org/2ol6/10/o4/the-politics-of-climate [http://perma.cc/ACX4
-EM6D].
220. But see Jack Zhou, Boomerangs Versus Javelins: How Polarization Constrains Communication on
Climate Change, 25 ENvrL. POL. 788 (2016) (finding that polarization may render climate
change communications that use a national security framing ineffective).
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that where climate-conscious presidential administration resulted in judicially
reviewable outcomes, the Obama Administration's climate-consciousness
efforts mirrored judicial precedents that encouraged administrative uses of sci-
entific, technical, and expert knowledge. Especially when viewed in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Obama Administration's
initiatives appeared to respond to a judicial demand to give scientifically sound,
apolitical reasons for climate change-related decisions.
This Part explains how the Obama Administration's fourth pillar responded
to three lines of caselaw: first, judicial acceptance of authoritative scientific as-
sessments like the NCA and the IWG-SCC's SCC estimates; second, judicial
treatment of climate change under NEPA; and third, decisions that heightened
the importance of considering costs and benefits in reasoned decision making.
As will be discussed in Part IV, all three lines of caselaw may contribute to the
fourth pillar's durability during the Trump presidency.
A. Judicial Treatment of Scientific Assessments on Climate Change
The Obama Administration benefited from a judiciary that had begun to
recognize the gravity of climate change as a public issue and was wary of politi-
cal interference with government science.
Traditionally, reviewing courts have entrusted factual findings about con-
tested scientific issues to administrative agencies.22 1 For issues like climate
change, a highly complex phenomenon whose components involve varying de-
grees of certainty,222 adjudicating the validity of agency judgments is difficult.
Two lines of precedent illuminate this area of law, with the first line addressing
221. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011) ("The expert agency
is surely better equipped to do the job than individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-
by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological resources
an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order.") (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)); Citizens To Pres. Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("Although this inquiry into the facts is to be search-
ing and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empow-
ered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.").
222. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that
" [w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal." Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science
Basis: Summaryfor Policymakers, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2013),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ars/wgi/WGiAR5SPMFINAL.pdf [http://
perma.cc/YWM9-ETDE]. However, the IPCC is less certain about other attributes of cli-
mate change. For example, the IPCC only has "[f]ow confidence" in its assessment that
there have been global " [i]ncreases in intense tropical cyclone activity." Id. at 7.
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matters at the frontiers of science and the second line addressing well-settled
knowledge.
First, the Court in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC required particular-
ly strong deference where agencies act within their areas of expertise in matters
that lie "at the frontiers of science."223 The Court's judgment echoed the D.C.
Circuit's en banc judgment in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, where the court found that
for issues on the "frontiers of scientific knowledge," agencies were expected to
make a mixed fact-policy inquiry that combined limited and uncertain scientific
data with policy judgments about risk management.224 Still, the Ethyl court
conducted an extensive rational-basis review of EPA's factual findings that un-
dergirded a regulation, finding that the agency took reasonable steps in the face
of conflicting scientific evidence.22 5 Other panels of the D.C. Circuit have justi-
fied the approaches taken in cases like Ethyl, noting that "[iit is not [the
courts'] function to resolve disagreement among the experts or to judge the
merits of competing expert views."226
Second, courts have looked skeptically on agency attempts to reject well-
settled knowledge, especially where reputable scientific bodies have made au-
thoritative judgments about complex phenomena. Where administrative agen-
cies' judgments contradict authoritative findings, reviewing courts have re-
quired agencies to justify those departures. For example, in reviewing EPA's
judgment that an emissions control technology for motor vehicles was techni-
cally feasible, Judge Leventhal in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus in-
validated an attempt by EPA to reject a report by the National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS) without providing a sound justification.2 27
223. 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
224. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (enshrining this principle).
In Ethyl, the D.C. Circuit mentioned the voluminous and indeterminate nature of the ad-
ministrative record, which spanned over io,ooo pages, noting that "evidence may be isolated
that supports virtually any inference one might care to draw." Id. at 37.
225. Id. at 37-48. "Thus, after considering the inferences that can be drawn from the studies sup-
porting the Administrator, and those opposing him, we must decide whether the cumulative
effect of all this evidence, and not the effect of any single bit of it, presents a rational basis
for the low-lead regulations." Id. at 38.
226. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 116o (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing AFL-CIO v. Marshall,
617 F.2d 636, 651 & n.66 (D.C. Cit. 1979)). Deference is even stronger when agencies are
making such reasoned judgments "within [their] area[s] of special expertise." Balt. Gas &
Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at lo.
227. Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cit. 1973) (" [T]he NAS conclu-
sion was that technology was not available to meet the standards in 1975. Congress called on
NAS, with presumed reliance on the knowledge and objectivity of that prestigious body, to
make an independent judgment .... While ... EPA was not necessarily bound by NAS's
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The basic facts of climate change, which were in part bolstered by the
Obama Administration's scientific efforts, are well-settled. Three recent deci-
sions have demonstrated this judicial acceptance of the basic facts of climate
change. Importantly, these decisions also reflect a judicial preoccupation with
the risk of political interference with government climate science. The Obama
Administration explicitly avoided such interference.
In Massachusetts v. EPA,2 28 the Supreme Court relied on the history of con-
gressional action on climate change229 and expert reports to find that -contrary
to EPA's position-carbon dioxide fell under the broad definition of the term
"air pollutant" in the Clean Air Act.230 These expert reports included the First
Assessment Report by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC);231 the IPCC's Second Assessment Report;2 3 2 a 2001 study by
the NRC;23 3 and testimony by Michael MacCracken, the former executive di-
rector of the GCRP.234 Although the Massachusetts Court did not compel a
approach, particularly as to matters interlaced with policy and legal aspects, we do not think
that it was contemplated that EPA could alter the conclusion of NAS by revising the NAS as-
sumptions, or injecting new ones, unless it states its reasons for finding reliability-possibly
by challenging the NAS approach in terms of later-acquired research and experience."); see
also Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(noting that "EPA's decision to reduce gasoline lead ... was supported by the overwhelming
majority of comments from health experts," that the decision was supported by all com-
ments from state and local governments, and that those comments were consistent with a
report by the NAS).
However, Judge Leventhal also emphasized that the International Harvester panel only
reluctantly took on the task of reviewing the EPA Administrator's judgments about a tech-
nical issue:
Our diffidence is rooted in the underlying technical complexities, and remains
even when we take into account that ours is a judicial review, and not a technical
or policy redetermination, our review is channeled by a salutary restraint, and
deference to the expertise of an agency that provides reasoned analysis.
478 F.2d at 641; see also Lead Indus. Ass'n, 647 F.2d at 1146 (expressing a similar view). Ulti-
mately, the D.C. Circuit remanded the action to the agency with a vague mandate to recon-
sider the decision and provide more robust reasons for the action. 478 F.2d at 650.
228. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
229. Id. at 507-08.
230. Id. at 528-29.
231. Id. at 5o8-o9.
232. Id. at 509.
233. Id. at 511; see also id. at 521 (noting specific forms of climate change damage detailed in the
20ol NRC report).
234. Id. at 521-22.
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regulatory action by EPA, it relied on authoritative assessments to support its
view that EPA needed to give more substantial reasons for inaction.23 5
Yet, as observed by Professors Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule, the
Massachusetts decision "illustrate [d] a larger theme" that went beyond the sub-
stantive regulatory problem at issue in the case: "the Court majority's increas-
ing worries about the politicization of administrative expertise."2 36 Freeman
and Vermeule explained that the Massachusetts Court rendered an "expertise-
forcing" decision, in which the Court-with full awareness of the George W.
Bush Administration's interference with government science - denied deference
to EPA in order to ensure scientifically sound treatment of climate change.237 in
this context, the Obama Administration's public commitment to scientific in-
tegrity-first expressed in March 2009238- responded directly to this judicial
demand for untainted expertise.
Judicial respect for genuine expert knowledge was even more prominent in
the D.C. Circuit's per curiam opinion in Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc.
v. EPA,239 a case that involved an "Endangerment Finding"240 that greenhouse
gases "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."241
In Coalition for Responsible Regulation, the panel engaged in a far-reaching dis-
cussion of the scientific and technical evidence in the administrative record,
with particular attention to assessment reports issued by the IPCC, NRC, and
GCRP.242 First, the court noted the exhaustive review process used to create the
reports, observing that " [t]hese peer-reviewed assessments synthesized thou-
sands of individual studies on various aspects of greenhouse gases and climate
change."243 Second, the court distinguished between the use of assessment re-
ports "as substitutes for [an agency's] own judgment" and the use of "evidence
235. Id. at 534-35.
236. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52.
237. Id.
238. See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
239. 684 F.3 d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam), aff'd in part, revd in part sub nom., Util. Air
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
240. Id. at 113; see also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. ch. I) (summarizing the EPA Administrator's findings that six greenhouse
gases "endanger[] public health and welfare").
241. Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012).
242. Coalition for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3 d at 119.
243. Id.
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upon which [an agency] relie [s] to make [a] judgment."24 4 Third, the court re-
jected an attempt by litigants to undermine the credibility of the assessment re-
ports by pointing to errors in a small subset of the underlying studies.245 in
sum, the Coalition for Responsible Regulation court confirmed the primacy of sci-
entific expertise in public administration, as well as the trust placed in assess-
ment reports that synthesize the state of scientific knowledge using rigorous
processes.
In Zero Zone, Inc. v. Department of Energy,24 6 a Seventh Circuit panel ex-
tended this logic to an application of the IWG-SCC's SCC estimates. In Zero
Zone, appellants challenged the credibility of the SCC estimates on several
grounds, but the Seventh Circuit placed trust in the IWG-SCC's process and
held that DOE had sufficiently responded to objections during the notice-and-
comment process. 247 Even though the IWG-SCC's SCC estimates were vulner-
able to extensive criticism, 24 8 the Seventh Circuit saw that the IWG-SCC had
done its best to reach an inherently difficult scientific judgment.
The Obama Administration's advancement of climate-consciousness was
marked by heavy investments in scientific, technical, and economic knowledge.
Federal courts' longstanding trust in such expertise had been enhanced in the
climate change context due to a judicial aversion to political interference. This
trust complemented the Obama Administration's use of scientific outputs to
support decision making and insistence on scientific integrity, which allayed
courts' fears of tainted science. Consequently, as discussed in Part IV, the sheer
strength of the scientific and technical record compiled by the Obama Admin-
istration may constrain the Trump Administration's authority to take contrary
actions. In particular, judicial scrutiny of such agency reversals may be height-
ened by the State Farm doctrine, which directs courts to more carefully question
the propriety of agency actions that upend factual and technical assumptions
that undergirded prior agency actions.
244. Id. at 120.
245. Id. at 125.
246. 832 F.3d 654 (7 th Cir. 2016).
247. Id. at 678. The Seventh Circuit's analysis here is quick, and the court did not discuss the
IWG-SCC's processes in great depth. Appellants also challenged DOE's authority to consid-
er the global cost of climate change, but this claim was also rejected by the court. Id. at 679.
Cost-benefit analysis is discussed in greater detail below. See infra Section II.C.
248. See supra Section I.C. 5.
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B. Caselaw on NEPA and Climate Change
Section I.C.3 characterized the Obama CEQ's NEPA climate change guid-
ance as both requiring and enabling agencies to incorporate climate-
consciousness into the NEPA process. This guidance was both a codification of
existing caselaw on NEPA and climate change, and a catalyst for future juris-
prudential development.
Before the late 2000S, courts had made it difficult for litigants to show
standing for lawsuits that sought to compel agencies to consider climate
change in their NEPA assessments. Courts also permitted agencies to ignore
climate change in NEPA processes on the basis that climate change impacts
" [fe] 11 below the threshold of significance."249 Yet, immediately before and dur-
ing the Obama presidency, federal courts began to liberalize standing for cli-
mate change challenges under NEPA and expand the requirement for climate
change to be addressed in an Environmental Assessment (EA) or Environmen-
tal Impact Statement (EIS). 250
Litigants claiming procedural injuries relating to climate change had long
struggled to establish standing.251 However, the D.C. Circuit in 20o9 recog-
nized a novel procedural theory of standing. In Center for Biological Diversity v.
Department of Interior, litigants were permitted to bring a climate change-
related NEPA claim because an agency's failure to consider climate change had
allegedly led to an erroneous decision that caused an unrelated injury.25 2 This
theory opened the door for a wider range of climate change suits under
NEPA. 25 3
Also around this time, courts began to heighten the requirement for federal
actors to consider climate change in their NEPA analyses. For example, in Cen-
terfor Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the
Ninth Circuit required the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) to correct a deficient environmental impact statement (EIS) for a
fuel economy regulation. The opinion rested on several grounds, including
249. Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environmental Impact Review Process, 22 NAT. RE-
SOURCEs &ENV'T, Winter 2008, at 20, 20.
250. See id. at 20-21 (discussing several cases that developed between those years, including Ctr.
forBiological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic SafetyAdmin., 538 F.3 d 1172 ( 9 th Cir. 2008)).
251. Mark Squillace & Alexander Hood, NEPA and Climate Change, in THE NEPA LITIGATION
GUIDE 261, 262-63 (Albert M. Ferlo et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
252. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
253. See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 2013); High Coun-
try Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1186-87 (D. Colo. 2014);
WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 8 F. Supp. 3d 17, 29-30 (D.D.C. 2014).
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NHTSA's failure to consider climate change in its EIS.254 The decision was one
of several255 indicating that NEPA caselaw had gradually shifted from permit-
ting agencies to consider climate change to mandating that agencies consider
climate change for regulatory actions with significant effects on greenhouse gas
emissions.
Yet this judicially imposed requirement to consider climate change in
NEPA analyses remained somewhat thin. Although courts had claimed to take
a "hard look" at how agencies address climate change in EISs and EAs, judges
had been hesitant to require agencies to conduct formal cost-benefit anal-
yses,25 enumerate specific climate change impacts that might arise from a pro-
ject,2 5 7 and quantify emissions.2 5 8 However, reviewing courts' reticence to im-
pose more rigorous requirements appeared to be driven by a view that it was
technically challenging to determine the causal relationship between emissions
and environmental impacts, not by skepticism that climate change was worthy
of careful analysis.259 Therefore, as climate science improves and agencies gain
access to analytical tools that lower the burden of engaging in thicker analyses,
courts may impose more rigorous analytical requirements for considering cli-
mate change under NEPA.
Thus, the NEPA climate change guidance released by the Obama CEQ was
in part a codification of a rapidly developing common law around NEPA and
climate change. However, the NEPA guidance did more than counsel agencies
about the importance of considering climate change in EAs and EISs: it in-
structed agencies on how they might consider climate change.26 0 These instruc-
254. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1214-
15 (2008).
255. See supra notes 252-261.
256. High Country Conservation Advocates, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1182 (noting that "NEPA does not re-
quire an explicit cost-benefit analysis to be included in an EIS" in relation to a climate
change-related claim).
257. Jewell, 738 F.3 d at 309 (declining to mandate a more specific EIS because "current science
does not allow for the specificity demanded by the Appellants").
258. San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 904 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1o68
(S.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that an EA's "eleven-page discussion of climate change issues,"
which included a discussion of how to reduce emissions from a project, was sufficient even
though the EA did not quantify emissions from the project); WildEarth Guardians v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 828 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1240 (D. Colo. 2011) (ruling that the Forest Service did
not have to determine "the precise impact on global warming" from a mine expansion be-
cause there was no "credibl [e]" way to precisely determine the "pro rata effect").
259. See San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coal., 904 F. Supp. 2d at lo68; WildEarth Guardi-
ans, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 1240.
26o. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
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tions from CEQ combined with scientific assessments produced by the Obama
Administration,2 6 1 enabled agencies to consider climate change in NEPA pro-
cesses. 26 2 Consequently, even though the Trump Administration has rescinded
the Obama CEQ's climate change guidance,2 63 litigants may point to the
Obama CEQ's climate change guidance as evidence that agencies are capable of
incorporating climate change into their EAs and EISs, and courts might enforce
a requirement to consider climate change under NEPA.
C. Caselaw on Cost-Benefit Analysis and Reasonableness
Over the last several years, federal courts have magnified the role of cost-
benefit analyses in substantive review of agency actions and required climate
change to be considered in cost-benefit analyses. The Obama Administration's
establishment of the IWG-SCC264 fits neatly into these trends.
Michigan v. EPA, the first Supreme Court decision that interpreted open-
ended statutory language to require an agency to consider costs, reflected the
rising importance of cost-benefit analysis in administrative rationality. Michi-
gan involved a section of the Clean Air Act265 that directed EPA to evaluate
whether "regulation is appropriate and necessary."2 66 The Court, in a majority
opinion written by Justice Scalia, held that "it was unreasonable for EPA to
read [the statutory provision] to mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial deci-
261. See, e.g., High Country Conservation Advocates, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1193 (ruling that the Forest
Service had to justify its decision to not monetize the social costs of emissions from an ac-
tion, because the IWG-SCC had "invested time and expertise" to develop figures that could
be used for agency actions).
262. Although NEPA does not vest regulatory authority in CEQ, courts nevertheless defer to
CEQ's NEPA regulations and guidance. See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358
(1979) (noting that CEQ's NEPA regulations deserved "substantial deference"); WildEarth
Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3 d 298, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (giving persuasive weight to a draft
version of CEQ's climate change guidance).
263. CEQ Withdraws Guidance on NEPA and Climate Change, COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. ON
CLIMATE CHANGE L.: CLIMATE DEREGULATION TRAcKER (Apr. 5, 2017), http://
columbiaclimatelaw.com/climate-deregulation-tracker/ceq-withdraws-guidance-on-nepa
-and-climate-change [http://perma.cc/H344-LV8U].
264. See supra Section I.C.5 . As detailed in Section I.C.4, the extent to which the Obama Admin-
istration used OIRA regulatory review to promote agency consideration of climate change is
unclear. There is weak evidence-within a small sample of RIAs examined-that some agen-
cies took climate change more seriously in their RIAs under the Obama Administration.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).
266. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012)).
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sion to regulate power plants. The Agency must consider cost ... ."2 6 7 Moreo-
ver, although the Court divided in a 5-4 vote along ideological lines, Justice Ka-
gan's dissent accepted the premise that EPA was required to consider costs in
its regulatory finding.268 As Professor Heinzerling observed,2 69 both Justice
Scalia's majority opinion and Justice Kagan's dissent moved beyond Entergy
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., in which the Court held that open-ended language in
the Clean Water Act did not prevent EPA from considering costs, to hold that
costs were an inextricable feature of rational analysis.2 70
Michigan can be read broadly or narrowly. Parts of Justice Scalia's opinion
suggest that the decision is narrowly tailored to the "appropriate and neces-
sary" language in section 112(n) of the Clean Air Act,2 7 1 while others make
sweeping claims about the importance of cost in reasoned decision making.2 72
Some lower courts have deployed Michigan expansively. The present state of
the caselaw is decidedly unclear.2 73
Two possible principles for reasoned decision making arise from this recent
set of judicial precedents. First, if an agency conducts a cost-benefit analysis,
climate change must be considered if it poses significant costs or benefits;2 74
and second, an agency should monetize changes in greenhouse gas emissions
where an authoritative SCC figure is available, absent a strong justification to
267. Id. at 2711.
268. Id. at 2716 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Cost is almost always a relevant-and usually, a highly
important - factor in regulation.").
269. Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REv. (forthcoming 2017) (manu-
script at 25), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2757770 [http://perma.cc/SL4L-3J5R].
270. 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n) (2012); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2709 ("And as we have discussed, context
establishes that this expansive standard encompasses cost.").
272. See, e.g., Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 ("Agencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant
factor when deciding whether to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects the understanding
that reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages and the
disadvantages of agency decisions.").
273. Lower courts have read Michigan at varying levels of abstraction. See, e.g., Nicopure Labs,
L.L.C. v. FDA, Nos. 16-0878 (ABJ), 16-1210 (ABJ), 2017 WL 3130312, at *32-33 (D.D.C. July
21, 2017) (placing significant weight on the statutory provision in question that contained
the "specific words 'appropriate and necessary"'); MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight
Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 239-42 (D.D.C. 2016) (interpreting provisions regarding bank-
ing risk in the Dodd-Frank Act with an eye to statutory purpose).
274. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3 d 1172, 1198-1202 ( 9 th Cir. 2008) ("Even if
NHTSA may use a cost-benefit analysis to determine the 'maximum feasible' fuel economy
standard, it cannot put a thumb on the scale by undervaluing the benefits and overvaluing
the costs of more stringent standards. NHTSA fails to include in its analysis the benefit of
carbon emissions reduction in either quantitative or qualitative form.").
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the contrary.2 75 The Obama Administration's actions echoed these principles by
providing agencies with the authoritative SCC figure and analytical tools neces-
sary to incorporate climate change into their analyses, empowering agencies to
fulfill the judicial demand for systematic assessments of costs and benefits.
As observed in this Part, President Obama encountered a judiciary that rec-
ognized the vulnerability of climate science to politicization and the consequent
importance of scientific process; the possibility that agencies should consider
climate change in NEPA analyses, providing that agencies had the tools to do
so; and the need for rigorous and balanced cost-benefit analyses. As the fourth
pillar was a rationality-enhancing project that both required and empowered
agencies to reason in a climate-conscious manner, it answered this judicial de-
mand for reasoned administration. By contrast, President Obama's fourth pillar
largely avoided a Congress that was hostile to climate change policy by taking
advantage of congressional inattention to obscure matters of administration.
III. LIMITED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF CLIMATE-
CONSCIOUSNESS
In contrast to the judiciary, which was receptive to climate-consciousness,
the Republican-controlled Congress was hostile to climate change responses.
Yet although Republican members of Congress pushed back against the fourth
pillar's more visible components with budgetary restrictions and public criti-
cism, Congress did not meaningfully counteract climate-consciousness. On a
theoretical level, this confirms Kagan's view that Congress is a relatively impo-
tent overseer of agency decision making.
In Presidential Administration, Kagan observed that a hostile Congress partly
motivated President Clinton's "turn[] to the bureaucracy."2 76 This mirrored
President Obama's resort to executive actions on climate change following the
2010 midterm election.2 7 7 Kagan also observed that Congress exhibited relative
"frailty" in exerting its own control over the administrative state, attributing
275. Id. at 1200-01 (in a decision before the IWG-SCC was convened, discussing that in the
agency record for a rule, extensive reference was made to a social cost of carbon figure de-
rived by the NAS, and faulting NHTSA for not using the figure in its cost-benefit analysis);
High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1193 (D. Co-
lo. 2014) ("I am not persuaded ... that it is reasonable completely to ignore a tool [the
IWG-SCC's estimates] in which an interagency group of experts invested time and exper-
tise."); see also Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 832 F.3 d 654, 678-79 (7 th Cir. 2016)
(defending DOE's use of the IWG-SCC's estimates).
276. Kagan, supra note 23, at 2248.
277. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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this weakness to "courts' refusal, in the face of broad delegations, to ratify al-
ternative mechanisms of legislative control" and to a judicial requirement that
"agency action bear the indicia of essentially apolitical, 'expert' process and
judgment."2 78 Again, this closely mirrored President Obama's fourth pillar. As
observed in Section I.C, President Obama used tools of control that were not
easily scrutinized by the legislative branch.
Congress was not entirely inattentive to these fourth-pillar exercises of
presidential control. As Kagan pointed out, "presidential dictation of adminis-
trative activity .. . sounds a very loud 'fire alarm' to a Congress controlled by
the other party,"2 79 and Congress responded to the fourth pillar with hearings,
harassment, and threats of sanction.28 0 Yet congressional scrutiny was distrib-
uted unevenly throughout the fourth pillar and centered on parts of the fourth
pillar that Congress could more easily control. The most concerted congres-
sional attacks on the fourth pillar centered on programs that Congress could
easily shape through its budgetary powers: the DOD's climate-consciousness
efforts and federally funded climate change science. With respect to the DOD,
the Republican majority in the House passed an amendment to a defense ap-
propriations bill in 2016 that attempted to restrict the DOD from using federal
funds to prepare for climate change.28 1 Although the appropriations bill died in
the Senate,28 2 the Republican amendment represented a serious effort to cut
back on climate-consciousness in the DOD. With respect to federally funded
climate change science, Republican members of Congress fought the Obama
Administration's attempts to allocate funding at every turn. Although the
Obama Administration secured large increases in funding for GCRP283 and
NASA's Earth Science division, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration's climate research programs and the National Science Founda-
tion's Geosciences division fared worse.284
On the other hand, Congress only sporadically or indirectly attacked com-
ponents of the fourth pillar that could not be counteracted with their budgetary
278. Kagan, supra note 23, at 2270.
279. Id. at 2348.
28o. See infra text accompanying notes 281-286; cf. Kagan, supra note 23, at 2347 (describing hear-
ings, harassment, and threats of sanction as the key congressional tools).
281. Vinik, supra note 198.
282. H.R. 5293 (114th): Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017, GovTRACK, http://www
.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr5293 [http://perma.cc/CMQ4-DFZ2].
283. See supra notes 176-177.
284. Matt Hourihan, Science and Technology Funding Under Obama: A Look Back, AM. Ass'N FOR
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powers. For example, Sunstein, who served as President Obama's OIRA direc-
tor from 2009 to 2012, was harangued by Republican members of the House in
a 2011 oversight hearing. Republican members of the House Oversight and In-
vestigations Subcommittee attacked Sunstein due to dissatisfaction with the
allegedly high level of new regulatory activity under the Obama Administra-
tion.285 This hearing reflected the prevailing antiregulatory sentiment among
Republican members of Congress, which continued into President Obama's
second term after Sunstein left office. Yet the hearing only targeted the public
face of a presidentialized and opaque process, reflecting the very limited ability
of Congress to oppose OIRA. Republican opposition was limited to pubic in-
vective, rather than policy resistance. As another example, a few Republican
members of Congress attacked the Obama CEQ's NEPA guidance on climate
change in statements to the press.286 Although such harassment and public crit-
icism associated with the fourth pillar were weak forms of control, they reflect-
ed a broader pattern of congressional hostility to acknowledgments of climate
change.
By contrast, concrete congressional opposition was directed at the first and
second pillars: climate change regulations and international climate change
agreements. Perhaps most famously, Republican members of Congress accused
the Obama Administration of waging a "war on coal" by promulgating the
Clean Power Plan, finalizing a wide range of other environmental regulations
including MATS287 that caused widespread retirements of coal-fired power
plants,288 and modifying the Department of Interior's program of coal leases on
federal lands.28 9 The Senate in late 2015 attempted to erode President Obama's
ability to broker the Paris Climate Change Agreement by denying the Admin-
istration's request for $3 billion in climate-related foreign aid for less developed
285. David Weigel, Nudge on Trial, SLATE (Jan. 26, 2011, 7:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles
/news-and politics/politics/2o11/ol/nudge-ontrial.html [http://perma.cc/2S7Z-6B66].
286. Rowena Lindsay, New Climate Change Policy: Republicans Object, Democrats Worry, CHRIS-
TIAN SCl. MONITOR (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2o16/o804
/New-climate-change-policy-Republicans-object-Democrats-worry [http://perma.cc/96TG
-3Q6N].
287. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
288. Obama's War on Coal, SENATE REPUBLICAN POL'Y COMMITTEE (May 15, 2012), http://www
.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/obamas-war-on-coa [http://perma.cc/L4MG-ENTF].
289. Rebecca Leber, How Obama Inserted the "War on Coal" into the 2o16 Race, NEw REPUBLIC
(Jan. 17, 2016), http://newrepublic.com/article/127833/obama-inserted-war-coa-2o16-race
[http://perma.cc/G5C9-BW6P].
229
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
countries and voting to repeal the Clean Power Plan.2 90 Although the vote to
repeal the Clean Power Plan was a "symbolic move"29 1 that was later vetoed by
President Obama,2 92 it reflected a serious effort to undermine President
Obama's ability to facilitate international cooperation on climate change.
The Republican Party's 2016 platform, an imperfect proxy for the Republi-
can response to President Obama's executive actions on climate change, rein-
forces the view that congressional pressure was primarily directed at the first
and second pillars. The platform explicitly mentioned the Clean Power Plan,293
Bureau of Land Management regulations,29 4 nuclear power policies,2 95 slow
permitting processes for liquefied natural gas export infrastructure,2 96 the Key-
stone XL pipeline,2 9 7 the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,2 98
and even the United Nations' Agenda 21.299 The only aspect of the fourth pillar
even mentioned in the Republican Party's platform was an Obama Administra-
tion effort to reduce the military's greenhouse gas emissions, 00 which was one
of the most-publicized aspects of the fourth pillar.o
290. Suzanne Goldenberg, Republicans Make Second Bid To Weaken Obama's Hand at Paris Climate
Talks, GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2015, 6:o9 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment
/2ol5/nov/19/republicans-make-second-bid-weaken-obamas-hand-paris-climate-talks
[http://perma.cc/7ZN5-QPEV].
291. Puneet Kollipara, In Symbolic Move, Congress Votes To Gut Obama Climate Plans, SCIENCE
(Dec. 2, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/12/symbolic-move
-congress-votes-gut-obama-climate-plans [http://perma.cc/YD9L-JT751.
292. Timothy Cama, Obama Vetoes GOP Push To Kill Climate Rules, HILL (Dec. 19, 2015, 8:35
AM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/2638o5-obama-vetoes-gop-attempts
-to-kill-climate-rules [http://perma.cc/R65U-GWl5].
293. Republican Platform 2016, COMMITTEE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR 2016 REPUBLICAN NAT'L
CONVENTION 19 (2016) http://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12
FINAL [i]-bena1468872234.pdf [http://perma.cc/LF9D-XZPY].
294. Id. at 19-20.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 20.
297. Id. at 19-20.
298. Id. at 22.
299. Id. at 51. Agenda 21 is a non-binding United Nations resolution about sustainable develop-
ment passed in 1992. The Republican Party has gradually come to embrace the notion that
Agenda 21 is "a United Nations-led conspiracy to deny property rights and herd citizens to-
ward cities." Leslie Kaufman & Kate Zernike, Activists Fight Green Projects, Seeing U.N. Plot,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/o2/o4/us/activists-fight-green
-projects-seeing-un-plot.html [http://perma.cc/ICYA8-BAVG].
300. Republican Platform 2o16, supra note 293, at 20.
301. See supra notes 217-218 and accompanying text.
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Congress's weaker and more intermittent oversight of the fourth pillar may
be explained by the low political salience of climate-conscious efforts diffused
widely across - and submerged deeply within - the administrative state. Even
though these fourth pillar mechanisms were not secret,302 and even though
Congress was much more interested in the finer points of government opera-
tions than the public, 03 much of the fourth pillar's initiatives lacked the sali-
ence that would have placed them on the congressional agenda. 304
An exegesis of issue salience and the political agenda-setting process is far
beyond the scope of this Note. 0 s Yet some reasoned observations may be
drawn about the causes of Congress's weak responses to the fourth pillar. By
their very nature, President Obama's executive actions on climate change com-
bined a wide range of presidential tools that were already available due to his
inherent powers and already-delegated authority. Among these actions, the
fourth pillar was comprised of low-salience methods: it almost goes without
saying that the finer points of the Circular A-11 process and OIRA do not pique
public attention. This low salience meant that congressional pressure naturally
flowed toward the higher-salience aspects of President Obama's executive ac-
tions, namely first-pillar efforts like the Clean Power Plan and second-pillar
efforts like the Paris Agreement. The overshadowed fourth pillar only rose to
congressional attention when it entered the ambit of congressional budgetary
powers. As explained in Section I.C.2, the Obama Administration avoided such
budgetary control as much as possible by hiding climate change spending
throughout the federal budget.306 This underscores the critical difference be-
tween transparency and salience -even though the Obama Administration's cli-
mate-consciousness interventions in the administrative state were publicly dis-
closed with the exception of OIRA review, the fourth pillar's interventions into
administration lacked the salience necessary to trigger congressional "fire
alarms."
302. The materials used in this Note are all publicly available records.
303. Bryan D. Jones & Frank R. Baumgartner, Representation and Agenda Setting, 32 POL'Y STUD. J.
1, 5 fig. 1, 6 fig. 2 (2004).
304. See Glen S. Krutz, Issues and Institutions: "Winnowing" in the U.S. Congress, 49 AM. J. PoL.
ScI. 313, 322-24 (2005) (describing the various factors that may determine whether a bill is
winnowed out in the congressional process, and noting that most issues do not reach con-
gressional consideration).
305. In fact, books have been written about this subject. See, e.g., BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R.
BAUMGARTNER, THE POLITICS OF ATTENTION: How GOVERNMENT PRIORITIZES PROBLEMS
(2005).
306. See supra notes lo9-n1o and accompanying text.
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These observations are consistent with, and somewhat additive to, Kagan's
views about congressional oversight of administrative processes. Kagan be-
lieved that due to judicially imposed constraints on congressional control of
administrative processes and judicial faith in technocratic expertise, congres-
sional oversight was generally an impotent counterweight to presidential ad-
ministration. Yet President Obama's climate-consciousness efforts appeared to
use a subset of presidential interventions that were even more ill-suited for
congressional interference: namely, the Obama Administration shaped the
technocratic internal processes of the executive branch to achieve its policy ob-
jectives.
Following his inauguration, President Trump has started to reverse these
efforts to control deeply ingrained executive-branch processes. Mirroring con-
gressional Republicans, candidate Trump frequently expressed disapproval of
President Obama's actions on climate change and targeted specific high-
salience actions like the Paris Climate Change Agreement and the Clean Power
Plan, 0 7 declining to call attention to the executive branch's internal processes.
Nevertheless, President Trump has quickly moved to dismantle the fourth pil-
lar following his inauguration by rescinding Obama-era executive orders,
withdrawing guidance and scientific reports, and threatening to overhaul gov-
ernment scientific processes for climate change. This attack on the fourth pillar
has proceeded with virtually no congressional role, underlining the limited ex-
tent of congressional involvement in climate-conscious administration. This
shift to a diametrically opposed presidential outlook raises significant puzzles
about the durability of outcomes achieved through presidential administration,
the separation of powers, and the role of democratic engagement in securing a
sustainable future.
IV. THE DURABILITY OF CLIMATE-CONSCIOUSNESS
[I]f Donald Trump is elected, for example, you have a pretty big
shift .... And there is no doubt that when you have a legislative ratifi-
cation of a policy, that it is firmer, it is less subject to reversal. But keep
in mind that what happens when we come up with smart policies and
regulations that prove to work, it becomes stickier; it's harder, then, to
232
307. See, e.g., Interview by Bill O'Reilly with Donald Trump, presidential candidate (Dec. 4,
2015), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=n3948 [http://perma.cc/PT9H-IGMJQ].
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reverse. So all these individual and collective steps that have been taken,
they lock in: they embed us moving in a certain direction.
President Barack Obama, interview with the New York Timesos
When examining the fourth pillar of climate policy, one might intuitively
suspect that the fruits of presidential administration will be easily reversed by
the Trump Administration. The risk of reversal following the presidential tran-
sition is enhanced by expansive presidential power in the modern United
States, which may enable an "imperial" executive that acts arbitrarily and with
few constraints.0 9 This Part begins by assessing the Trump Administration's
efforts to dismantle President Obama's fourth pillar to date. It then assesses the
formal legal constraints and non-legal factors that may stymie the Trump Ad-
ministration's attempts to reverse President Obama's policies. The Part identi-
fies two key factors that may slow deregulatory efforts after an abrupt change
in presidential stances to climate change: first, the persistence of sound gov-
ernment science that demonstrates the importance of climate change; and sec-
ond, bureaucratic inertia and backlash.
A. Dismantling the Fourth Pillar
Bucking the general narratives1 o that the Trump Administration has been
slow to act in its initial months, the Trump Administration has moved quite
efficiently to degrade President Obama's fourth pillar.
Thus far, the Trump Administration has primarily targeted the fourth pillar
with two executive orders. On March 28, 2017, President Trump issued an ex-
ecutive order that dismantled many aspects of President Obama's fourth pil-
308. Davis et al., supra note 20.
309. Many scholars have expressed this concern. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); ARTHURM. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRES-
IDENCY (1973); PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: How EXECUTIVE POwER THREAT-
ENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law,
122 HARv. L. REV. 1095 (2009); cf ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) (claiming that even though the execu-
tive is generally unbound from formal constraints, other factors meaningfully cabin execu-
tive action).
310. See, e.g., Lisa Rein, Slow Pace of Trump Nominations Leaves Cabinet Agencies "Stuck" in Staffing
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lar." The order rescinded the Obama CEQ's NEPA guidance on climate
change;3 12 disbanded the IWG-SCC and withdrew its SCC estimates;"' with-
drew a presidential memorandum on climate change and national security;314
and rescinded President Obama's Executive Order 13,653,15 which required
federal departments and agencies to begin adapting to the impacts of climate
change.3 1 6 On August 15, 2017, President Trump signed another executive or-
der" to strike Executive Order 13,690, an order issued by President Obama
that required the consideration of climate-induced changes in precipitation
when designating floodplains."'" Although the Trump Administration has left
untouched President Obama's executive orders relating to reductions in federal
greenhouse gas emissions, improvements in federal energy efficiency, and
agency sustainability plans, President Trump's two executive orders neverthe-
less eliminated some of the fourth pillar's core provisions.
The Trump Administration has also targeted federal scientific efforts relat-
ing to the environment and climate change. During the first months of the
Trump presidency, EPA dismissed members of its Board of Scientific Counse-
lors with the likely intent of replacing those members with industry representa-
tives. 9 In more public moves against the fourth pillar's prioritization of politi-
cally insulated scientific judgments, federal government websites were
scrubbed of information about climate change,320 and EPA Administrator Scott
Pruitt announced plans to start a "red team-blue team" process to provide a
platform for fringe climate change skeptics who deny well-accepted scientific
311. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
312. Id. § 3(c).
313. Id. § 5(b).
314. Id. § 3(a)(iv)-
31s. Id. § 3 (a) (i).
316. See supra Section I.C.I. The order also targeted first-pillar policies by directing the EPA to
review the Clean Power Plan and instructing the Bureau of Land Management to revisit pol-
icies regarding methane emissions and hydrocarbon production on federal and tribal lands.
Exec. Order No. 13,783, §§ 4, 6-7, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
317. Exec. Order No. 13,807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40463 (Aug. 15, 2017).
318. See supra note 75.
319. Coral Davenport, EPA Dismisses Members of Major Scientific Review Board, N.Y. TIMES
(May 7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/07/us/politics/epa-dismisses-members
-of-major-scientific-review-board.html [http://perma.cc/N3MY-NBQG].
320. Oliver Milman & Sam Morris, Trump Is Deleting Climate Change, One Site at a Time, GUARD-
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theories.32 1 Giving a voice to such skeptics would depart drastically from the
Obama Administration's insistence on scientific integrity.322 Finally, the White
House proposed a budget that would slash scientific funding for NASA, the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, and EPA,323 revers-
ing the Obama Administration's practice of supporting government climate
change science.
These early attacks against President Obama's fourth pillar paint a bleak
picture for the durability of climate-consciousness in the Trump Administra-
tion. However, the fourth pillar may prove surprisingly durable due to both
formal and informal constraints on presidential power.
B. Formal Legal Constraints
Climate-consciousness may be protected by administrative-law doctrines,
especially the requirement for agency decision making to rely on sound scien-
tific reasoning. Notably, courts have applied such rationality requirements with
greater force for agency policy reversals. Further, a recent conservative turn in
administrative law raises the possibility of reduced deference and greater judi-
cial scrutiny of administrative actions. These doctrines, combined with the
Obama Administration's vast pool of scientific, technical, and economic as-
sessments on climate change, may provide potent ammunition for sophisticat-
ed interest groups to credibly challenge Trump Administration cost-benefit
analyses, NEPA EAs or EISs, and other agency justifications for administrative
action.
Interest group pressure may slow the revocation of climate-conscious poli-
cies starting from the pre-rulemaking stage, the extreme "front end" where
agencies interface with stakeholders to shape their policy proposals.3 24 By reg-
321. Brad Plumer & Coral Davenport, EPA To Give Dissenters a Voice on Climate, No Matter the
Consensus, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2o17/o6/3o/climate/scott
-pruitt-climate-change-red-team.html [http://perma.cc/K4E8-U8JR].
322. For a critique of the "red team-blue team" approach, see Kelly Levin, Pruitt's "Red Team-Blue
Team" Exercise a Bad Fit for EPA Climate Science, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (June 20, 2017),
http://www.wri.org/blog/2o17/o6/pruitts-red-team-blue-team-exercise-bad-fit-epa
-climate-science [http://perma.cc/5EJ4-57RD].
323. Doyle Rice & Ledyard King, Trump's Budget Proposal "Savages" Climate Research, Scientists
Say, USA TODAY (May 23, 2017), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2o17/o5/23
/trumps-budget-proposal-savages-climate-research-scientists-say/102o62556 [http://perma
.cc/5L76-91C5R].
324. See William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules and the Limits of
Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 576 (2009) (explaining the importance of this "front
end").
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istering strong objections to potential agency actions and credibly signaling the
possibility of legal challenges, sophisticated interest groups -for example, "Big
Green" groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental
Defense Fund, and the Sierra Club - may force agencies to rethink their actions
and develop justifications that are more likely to survive judicial review. During
the notice-and-comment period, these groups may submit opposing legal
views and technical evidence to the administrative docket, creating a need for
government agencies - possibly in collaboration with industry groups - to cre-
ate and submit countervailing evidence. When such administrative actions are
litigated, pro-environmental interest groups may then refer to the vast pool of
scientific information produced during the Obama presidency to reveal incon-
sistencies.
Two areas of doctrine may provide further support for such private liti-
gants. First, the doctrine regarding regulatory reversals in Motor Vehicle Manu-
facturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. requires an agency
"changing its course" to "supply a reasoned analysis ... beyond that which may
be required when an agency does not act in the first instance."32 5 In FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc.,326 five justices of the Court extended this general prin-
ciple and agreed that at least some agency reversals required stronger justifica-
tions.327 In the climate change context, reviewing courts may -as discussed in
Section II.A- be particularly sensitive to the possibility of political interference
with climate change science. Therefore, a reviewing court may apply the full
brunt of the State Farm doctrine if an administrative agency justifies an action
with a transparently politicized repudiation of mainstream climate change sci-
ence and Obama-era government assessments.
Second, a slowly building jurisprudence that questions deference to agency
statutory interpretations could aid private litigants that challenge reversals of
climate-conscious policies.32 8 In recent years, conservative judges have voiced
325. 463 U.S. 29,42 (1983).
326. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
327. Id. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with
Justice Breyer's dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg). As ex-
plained by Randy J. Kozel and Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Fox led to a complicated set of concur-
rences and dissents. "A majority ... refused to subject an administrative reversal to height-
ened scrutiny, but a different coalition of five Justices indicated that at least some agency
reversals require more rigorous review." Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administra-
tive Change, 59 UCLAL. REv. 112,129 (2011).
328. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1188 (2016); Heinzerling,
The Power Canons, supra note 269; Jody Freeman, The Chevron Sidestep: Professor Freeman on
King v. Burwell, HARv. ENVTL. L. PROGRAM (June 2015), http://environment.law
.harvard.edu/2o15/o6/the-chevron-sidestep [http://perma.cc/48ES-PHSM]; Patrick Greg-
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skepticism about the administrative state,329 including a withering critique of
the Chevron doctrine by Justice Gorsuch during his tenure as a judge on the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 3 o If this claw-back of deference is indeed oc-
curring, it could increase judicial scrutiny of agency changes in course, thereby
crystallizing previous agency decisions. Obama-era environmental initiatives
are especially susceptible to this solidification in light of their reliance on hard
data.
For example, assume that Michigan v. EPA is part of a rollback of deference.
In other words, assume that the broad reading of Michigan limits agency statu-
tory interpretations by holding that the agency may not interpret open-ended
delegations to omit the consideration of costs. 3
Traditionally, deference has been understood as a pro-regulatory practice.
Efforts to limit deference have been the province of conservative judges and le-
gal scholars who hold constitutional concerns about the legitimacy of the ad-
ministrative state.332 Similarly, cost-benefit analysis has traditionally been used
as a deregulatory tool. Cost-benefit analysis came into being as a Reagan Ad-
ministration tool to reduce regulation, leading to skepticism by pro-labor and
environmental interests.' To this day, left-leaning scholars criticize the inabil-
ity of cost-benefit analysis to account for many of the benefits of environmental
ory, Scholars Concerned About Chevron Deference "Retreat," BLOOMBERG BNA (June 9, 2016),
http://www.bna.com/scholars-concerned-chevron-n57982o73856 [http://perma.cc/V9DW
-48 7Y]-
329. Robin Bravender, Alito Snubs Chevron, Obama EPA's "Eraser," GREENWIRE (Nov. 17, 2016),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2o16/11/17/stories/o6oo45952 [http://perma.cc/CD8R
-U3AZ] (reporting on a talk by Justice Alito at the Federalist Society's annual convention,
where Justice Alito described his and the late Justice Scalia's skepticism about Chevron).
330. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1158 (loth Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
("We managed to live with the administrative state before Chevron. We could do it again.").
331. See Andrew M. Grossman, Michigan v. EPA: A Mandate for Agencies To Consider Costs, 2015
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 281, 294 (relating Michigan to Chevron and State Farm); Heinzerling, su-
pra note 269, at 5-6; Case Note, Michigan v. EPA, 129 HARv. L. REV. 311, 316 (2015) ("Michi-
gan has the potential to alter two seminal doctrines governing judicial review of administra-
tive action: Chevron and State Farm."); Philip Hamburger, Chevron's Last Days?,
POWERLINE (July 2, 2015), http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2015/o7/philip
-hamburger-chevrons-last-days.php [http://perma.cc/7UBZ-WMAE].
332. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, Is ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
333. REvEsz & LIVERMORE, supra note 139, at 24-29; see also SHANE, supra note 309, at 149-54
(documenting the role of OIRA in the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton administra-
tions).
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protection.334 However, as Professors Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore
have posited, cost-benefit analysis-if conducted properly-need not have a
pro-regulatory or anti-regulatory bias.' Instead, cost-benefit analysis can be
debiased by developing ways to account for difficult-to-quantify values, con-
sidering ancillary benefits,336 and acknowledging its inherent limitations.3
From this point of view, cost-benefit analysis can be a tonic for flawed rules
that might over-regulate, under-regulate, or mis-regulate in various ways." If
Michigan was an attempt to limit deference by requiring agencies to include
cost-benefit analyses in their reason-giving, Michigan could then have the
counterintuitive effect of reinforcing President Obama's attempt to embed cli-
mate change into federal decision making, as Obama-era resources both justify
why agencies should account for climate change and facilitate agencies in doing
SO.
Of course, there are limitations to these formal legal constraints. First, Pres-
ident Trump has broad supervisory powers to inject policy considerations into
rulemaking processes.'" As Professor Nina Mendelson argues, few forms of
presidential pressure are "clearly out of bounds."340 Second, the cost-benefit re-
quirement foreshadowed in Michigan may turn out to be more procedural than
substantive.34 1 Even if lower courts interpret Michigan expansively, President
Trump could easily fulfill the Michigan mandate to "consider" costs while ig-
334. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS (2004); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR,
REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY
(2010).
335. See REvESz & LIVERMORE, supra note 139, at 50-51 (pointing out that EPA developed im-
proved cost-benefit guidelines to counter OIRA's deregulatory bias).
336. Id. at 58-67.
337. See id. (noting the potential shortcomings in cost-benefit analysis).
338. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 3-29 (1993) (comparing risks that
are overestimated and over-regulated, with risks that are underestimated and under-
regulated); Richard Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 21, 28 (2001) (arguing that U.S. environmental protection suffers from simultaneous
over-regulation and under-regulation).
339. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("A change in administration ... is a perfectly reasonable basis
for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regula-
tions."); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (" [W]e do not believe that
Congress intended that the courts convert informal rulemaking into a rarified technocratic
process, unaffected by political considerations or the presence of Presidential power.").
340. Mendelson, supra note 24, at 1141.
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noring climate change by providing colorable reasons to weigh nonclimate fac-
tors more heavily. Finally, formal legal constraints only apply where there are
judicially reviewable outcomes. The judiciary is unlikely to provide recourse to
litigants if the Trump Administration simply chooses inaction via non-
enforcement or benign neglect.34 2
Yet at the very least, the Obama Administration's climate change assess-
ments, combined with the overwhelming weight of the present scientific con-
sensus on climate change, render pro-environmental litigants well-equipped to
delay or "ossify"343 regulatory actions. Given that the Trump Administration
has so far had difficulty in court justifying controversial actions with question-
able legal and factual foundations,34 4 private litigants could prevail on the
depth of the scientific data the Obama Administration cultivated in the federal
bureaucracy.
C. Inertia and Backlash
Nonjudicial phenomena may compound formal legal constraints in pre-
serving Obama-era climate-consciousness. Inertia, bureaucratic pushback, and
public bacldash may also frustrate the Trump Administration's effort to fully
dismantle President Obama's fourth pillar. Although these phenomena are
difficult to predict, the Trump Administration's first several months in office
342. See Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795
(2010) (arguing that the presumption of nonreviewability for enforcement decisions, when
combined with strong judicial scrutiny of agency policy reversals and rulemakings, creates
an incentive to pursue "deregulation through nonenforcement," which is shielded from pub-
lic view).
343. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE
L.J. 1385 (1992).
344. The first and second versions of President Trump's executive order on visas and refugees
(the so-called "travel ban") were notable for their inept design and weak factual support. See
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3 d 1151, 1168 (9 th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) ("The Government
has pointed to no evidence that any alien from any of the countries named in the Order has
perpetrated a terrorist attack in the United States. Rather than present evidence to explain
the need for the Executive Order, the Government has taken the position that we must not
review its decision at all'"); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3 d 741, 772-73 (9 th Cir. 2017) (per curi-
am) (stating that the President Trump's second immigration order "[did] not provide a ra-
tionale explaining why permitting entry of nationals from the six designated countries un-
der current protocols would be detrimental to the interests of the United States"); see also
Benjamin Wittes, Malevolence Tempered by Incompetence: Trump's Horrifying Executive Order
on Refugees and Visas, LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2017, 1o:58 PM), http://lawfareblog.com
/malevolence-tempered-incompetence-trumps-horrifying-executive-order-refugees-and
-visas [http://perma.cc/U9LH-BZTH] (claiming that President Trump's first executive or-
der on immigration was incompetently drafted).
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provide preliminary signs that climate-consciousness may be deeply en-
trenched in certain parts of the federal government and that efforts to stamp
out climate-consciousness may face unlikely foes, ranging from EPA bureau-
crats to Republican members of Congress.
Presidential administration, however well-executed, may be frustrated by a
federal bureaucracy that is steeped in routine and prone to inertia. As President
Truman famously quipped of President Eisenhower, "He'll sit here, and he'll
say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like
the Army. He'll find it very frustrating."3 45 If anything, President Trump has -
as of the time of writing -reportedly found it difficult to control the sprawling
federal government.34 6
Although President Trump has issued executive orders to dismantle the
fourth pillar and attacked federal climate change and environmental science,
these actions have not fully addressed climate-consciousness, which is decen-
tralized throughout the administrative state. As noted in Section I.C.2, federal
funding for climate change activities is hidden throughout the federal budget.
As Section I.C.4 described, some agencies like the DOE tend to consider cli-
mate change even in the absence of overt presidential direction. Finally, the
analysis of the military's climate-consciousness in Section I.C.6 demonstrates
that key decisionmakers in the Pentagon have viewed climate change as a key
strategic issue since at least the early 199os. As the GAO noted in 2011, " [t]he
overall scale of the federal climate change enterprise makes it difficult for offi-
cials to be aware of the whole range of programs and activities . .. 1"37 In other
words, climate-consciousness may be too ingrained to be easily stripped from
the federal bureaucracy.
To reinforce this difficulty, agencies may respond imperfectly to presiden-
tial mandates due to habit. Bureaucratic agencies are often defined by regular-
ized and stable practices.348 For example, even though CEQ has rescinded the
345. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 10 (1990); see
also Kagan, supra note 23, at 2272 (making use of this famous quote).
346. See, e.g., Alex Isenstadt et al., Trump Vexed by Challenges, Scale of Government, POLITICO (Feb.
10, 2017, 5:o6 AM), http://secure.politico.com/story/2017/02/donald-trump-challenges
-governing-presidency-234879 [http://perma.cc/5BTD-EP29] (describing internal divisions
in the Trump White House, problems in allocating and delegating responsibilities, and a
"rocky" transition of power).
347. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-31 7 , CLIMATE CHANGE: IMPROVEMENTS NEED-
ED To CLARIFY NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND BETTER ALIGN THEM WITH FEDERAL FUNDING DE-
CISIONS (2011).
348. In fact, Max Weber, whose scholarship launched the modern study of bureaucracy, saw rou-
tine and regularization as a defining principle of bureaucracy. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND
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NEPA guidance on climate change, it is conceivable that some agencies will - as
a matter of course349 -continue to consider climate change when conducting
EAs and EISs. It is conceivable that some RIAs will continue to incorporate
climate change in their cost-benefit analyses. Such habits will likely be strong-
est for agencies with a long history of climate-consciousness, such as the DOE.
Additionally, the Trump Administration's environmental actions have been
met by a surprising amount of bureaucratic pushback, which may serve as a
potent check against presidential power. 5 o Conventional accounts of bureau-
cratic resistance, which study the period following President Reagan's rise to
power, have suggested that career civil servants will generally comply with de-
mands by a new presidential administration5 1 and follow their self-perceived
subordinate roles as unelected government officials.3 52 However, there is at
least some evidence that bureaucrats in the Trump Administration are depart-
ing from these norms. Rogue Twitter accounts by government employees have
lampooned and lambasted the Administration,5 3 government employees have
leaked a section of the Fourth National Climate Assessment to preempt the
possibility of political interference,354 longtime civil servants have dropped the
proverbial microphone with scathing critiques of the Trump Administration as
SOCIETY 956-58 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ.
of Cal. Press 1978) (1922).
349. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 313-14 (2012) (culmi-
nating a historical account of early American administrative law by stressing the need for
scholars to pay attention to ingrained patterns of agency practice).
350. See Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance from Below, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
(Nov. 16, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer
-nou [http://perma.cc/VZG2-UG6V].
351. See MARISSA MARTINo GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS?: POLITICS AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION DURING THE REAGANYEARS 155 (2000).
352. Id. at 155-56.
353. See, e.g., Steve Gorman, Defying Trump, Twitter Feeds for U.S. Government Scientists Go
Rogue, REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-resist
-idUSKBN1 5AoDI [http://perma.cc/HCX4-32X7].
354. Lisa Friedman, Scientists Fear Trump Will Dismiss Blunt Climate Report, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2o17/o8/o7/climate/climate-change-drastic-warming
-trump.html [http://perma.cc/F29L-PQMN]. There was a minor controversy as to whether
the section of the report leaked to the New York Times was already available to the public,
but it appears that the Times ended up publishing a version not available to the public. Eric
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they retired,"' and close-knit cadres inside agencies as diverse as EPA, the De-
partment of Labor, and the State Department have covertly organized in prepa-
ration for further resistance.3 56
These remarkable acts of bureaucratic pushback may be motivated in part
by the hostility of President Trump's appointees. For example, EPA Adminis-
trator Scott Pruitt is reputed as being "disdainful of the agency and the science
behind what the agency does.""' Since his appointment, Administrator Pruitt
has largely operated behind a veil of secrecy, rarely interacting with career EPA
staff and relying heavily on political appointees and industry lobbyists.' Giv-
en the tense relationships between Administrator Pruitt and EPA staff, it is un-
surprising that the agency's career civil servants have engaged in bare re-
sistance.
The DOD and U.S. Armed Forces, where climate-consciousness is strong
but presidential control is at its zenith, have also demonstrated a lingering
commitment to climate-consciousness. Despite serving as a member of Presi-
dent Trump's Cabinet, Secretary of Defense James Mattis has strongly and un-
equivocally defended the military's focus on climate change. 9 The military's
355. Joe Davidson, EPA Staffer Leaves with a Bang, Blasting Agency Policies Under Trump, WASH.
POST: POWERPosT (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp
/2017/04/07/epa-staffer-leaves-with-a-bang-blasting-agency-policies-under-trump [http://
perma.cc/CUZ9-PGGR].
356. See Andrew Restuccia et al., Federal Workers Turn to Encryption To Thwart Trump, POLITICO
(Feb. 2, 2017, 5:07 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/federal-workers-signal
-app-234510 [http://perma.cc/G4NQ-RPQJ].
357. Elizabeth Kolbert, Earth to Pruitt: At a Confirmation Hearing, Denialism Stands While Temper-
atures Rise, NEW YORKER (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment
/earth-to-pruitt-at-a-confirmation-hearing-denialism-stands-while-temperatures-rise
[http://perma.cc/LY88-PPZE] (quoting Christine Todd Whitman, a former New Jersey
governor who served as EPA Administrator during the George W. Bush presidency).
358. Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, Scott Pruitt Is Carrying Out His E.PA. Agenda in Secret, Crit-
ics Say, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2o17/o8/11/us/politics/scott
-pruitt-epa.html [http://perma.cc/N3MY-NBQG].
359. In written testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Mattis assert-
ed, "Climate change is impacting stability in areas of the world where our troops are operat-
ing today .... It is appropriate for the Combatant Commands to incorporate drivers of in-
stability that impact the security environment in their areas into their planning." Andrew
Revkin, Trump's Defense Chief Cites Climate Change as National Security Challenge, SCIENCE
(Mar. 14, 2017, 1:oo PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/trump-s-defense
-chief-cites-climate-change-national-security-challenge [http://perma.cc/VT7W-VEFX];
see also Erika Bolstad, Trump Likely To Downplay Climate as Security Threat, CLIMATEWIRE
(Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/lo60046229 [http://perma.cc
/CW7 X-WPDJ] (quoting interviewees who suspect that some Pentagon climate change pol-
icies will survive due to their cost- or life-saving qualities).
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commitment to combating climate change has even swayed Republican mem-
bers of Congress. In August 2017, forty-six House Republicans crossed partisan
lines to reject an amendment to an annual defense bill that would have elimi-
nated a mandate for the DOD to prepare for climate change impacts.360 This
rebellion against the Republican Party's official position on climate change sig-
nals that the Pentagon's longstanding work on climate change, combined with
the Obama Administration's support for such efforts, may have started to per-
suade legislators to pay greater heed to climate change.
In summary, President Obama's fourth pillar provides extensive opportuni-
ties for private litigants to protect climate-consciousness. Given the dispersed
nature of the fourth pillar, the Trump Administration may find it difficult to
eliminate climate change programs and counter bureaucratic opposition. For
parts of the government like the DOD with long traditions of climate-
consciousness, even Republican members of Congress may oppose efforts to
roll back climate-consciousness. Although the fate of climate-consciousness
may ultimately depend on whether President Trump wins a second term in
office, President Obama's fourth pillar may prove surprisingly durable. The
fourth pillar will, at the very least, provide a blueprint for future Presidents to
motivate the vast federal bureaucracy to address complex public problems like
climate change.
CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY AND CLIMATE-CONSCIOUSNESS
This Note identified and explored an unrecognized component of the
Obama Administration's executive actions on climate change. The fourth pillar
represented a remarkably broad and deep intervention into the administrative
state that advanced the envelope of presidential administration. The Obama
Administration combined a diverse and interlocking array of interventions that
relied heavily on good science and combined top-down directives and incen-
tives with bottom-up implementation. The fourth pillar was highly responsive
to a judicial demand for sound, reasoned, and evidence-driven responses to
climate change. However, the fourth pillar left Congress somewhat out of the
picture, and Congress directed its political opposition at higher-salience pillars
of President Obama's Climate Action Plan.
Just as the fourth pillar complemented a judicial desire for more rational
management of climate change, dismantling the fourth pillar may prove diffi-
360. David Siders, More GOP Lawmakers Bucking Their Party on Climate Change, POLITIcO (Aug.
19, 2017, 7:45 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/19/more-gop-lawmakers
-bucking-their-party-on-climate-change-241800 [http://perma.cc/93XE-8F391.
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cult because climate-unconsciousness is irrational. Yet judicial challenges to the
Trump Administrations climate-unconscious executive actions are-at best-
likely to only slow the pace of deregulation. Bureaucratic inertia and public
bacldash may also render climate-consciousness more durable. In particular,
the public bacldash against the Trump Administrations denials of climate
change has created room for some Republican members of Congress to defy
the party line on climate change, representing a possible signal of democratic
revitalization on climate change.
Kagan observed that presidential administration can promote both admin-
istrative effectiveness and democratic accountability. As this Note has argued,
the Obama Administrations efforts generally promoted administrative effec-
tiveness by directing and enabling federal departments and agencies to serious-
ly and rationally respond to a grave public problem. Nevertheless, some aspects
of the fourth pillar also raise significant questions about democratic accounta-
bility, diverging from Kagans account. For example, even though public opin-
ion during the Obama Presidency overwhelmingly favored treating climate
change as a serious public problem,36 1 there is something unsettling about the
Obama Administrations practice - however well-intended- of deliberately hid-
ing money throughout the federal budget to evade congressional scrutiny.
This points to a fundamental shortcoming of presidential administration.
Ultimately, executive power may be an inferior substitute for a well-
functioning legislature that passes well-considered laws that reflect the demo-
cratic interest and fosters the vigorous democratic process that is necessary362
to address a problem like climate change.
361. See Jocelyn Kiley, Ideological Divide Over Global Warming as Wide as Ever, PEW RES. CTR.
(June 16, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2o15/o6/16/ideological-divide-over
-global-warming-as-wide-as-ever [http://perma.cc/N2JM-H3C8] (showing that 69% of
Americans identified global warming as a "very" or "somewhat" serious problem).
362. For arguments that a revitalization of democracy is necessary to address climate change, see
KYsAR, supra note 334; Jedidiah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental
Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122 (2010).
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Hannah Block-Wehba, BA., J.D.
Rebecca Crootof, B.A., J.D., Ph.D.
Jason Eiseman, B.A., M.L.S.
Tamar Ezer, BA., J.D., LL.M.
Laura Fernandez, A.B., LL.M., J.D.
Joshua U. Galperin, B.A., J.D., M.E.M.
Shelley Geballe, B.A., J.D., M.P.H.
Lisa A. Goodman, B.A., B.S., J.D., M.L.I.S.
Linda Greenhouse, BA., M.S.L., Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law
Lucas Guttentag, A.B., J.D.
Claudia Haupt, LL.B., Ph.D., LL.M., J.S.D.
JordanA. Jefferson, B.S., J.D., M.L.I.S.
Julie Graves Krishnaswami, BA., J.D., M.L.I.S.
Christine Kwon, B.A., J.D.
John Langford, BA., B.M, J.D.
Stephen Latham, A.B., J.D., Ph.D.
Ruben Loyo, BA., J.D.
Evelyn L. Ma, BA., M.L.S., J.D.
Scott Matheson, BA., J.D., M.L.I.S., M.P.A.
Hope R. Metcalf, B.A., J.D.
John B. Nann, B.A., M.S.L.S., J.D.
Lucie Olejnikova, B.S., M.L.S., J.D.
Eugene Russyn, BA., J.D.
David A. Schulz, B.A., M.A., J.D., Floyd Abrams Clinical Lecturer in Law
Fred R. Shapiro, S.B., M.S.L.S., J.D.
Priscilla Smith, BA., J.D.
Stacia Stein, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S.
Anna VanCleave, B.A., M.A., J.D.
Michael VanderHeijden, B.A., J.D., M.L.S.
Graham Webster, B.S., A.M.
Aaron P. Wenzloff, B.BA., J.D.
Michael Widener, B.J., M.L.I.S.
VISITING LECTURERS IN LAW
Elizabeth K. Acee, B.S., J.D.
Mark Barnes, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
Craig Becker, B.A., J.D.
James Bhandary-Alexander, B.A., J.D.
Susan Biniaz, BA., J.D.
Diana Blank, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D.
Stephen B. Bright, BA., J.D., Harvey Karp Visiting Lecturer in Law
Craig B. Brod, B.A., J.D.
Sanford 0. Bruce III, B.A., J.D.
John J. Buckley, Jr., A.B., J.D.
Lincoln Caplan, BA., J.D., Truman Capote Visiting Lecturer in Law
Robert Chatigny, A.B., J.D.
Heather L. Coleman, B.A., J.D.
Kevin Cremin, BA., J.D.
Victoria A. Cundiff, B.A., J.D.
Benjamin M. Daniels, B.A., M.S., J.D.
Tadhg Dooley, BA., J.D.
W. Neil Eggleston, B.A., J.D.
Amy Eppler-Epstein, B.A., J.D.
Eugene R. Fidell, B.A., LL.B., Florence Rogatz Visiting Lecturer in Law
Lara Finkbeiner, B.A., M.S., J.D.
Adam Fleisher, A.B., J.D.
Gregory Fleming, B.A., J.D.
Lawrence J. Fox, BA., J.D., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Constance Frontis, B.A., J.D.
William Garfinkel, B.A., J.D.
Jeffrey Gentes, B.A., J.D.
Frederick S. Gold, B.A., J.D.
Daniel Goldberg, B.A., J.D.
David Harfst, BA., J.D.
David G. Hawkins, BA., J.D.
Rebecca M. Heller, A.B., J.D.
Paul W. Hughes, A.B., M.A., J.D.
Michael Kimberly, A.B., M.A., J.D.
Katherine M. Kimpel, B.A., J.D.
Alex A. Knopp, BA., J.D.
Katherine L. Kraschel, B.A., J.D.
Jonathan Landy, A.B., J.D.
Jonathan Lovvorn, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
Colman Lynch, B.A., J.D.
C.J. Mahoney, A.B., J.D.
Amy Marx, BA., MA., M.S., J.D.
Ellen Messali, B.A., J.D.
Jeffrey A. Meyer, B.A., J.D.
Joseph P. Moodhe, B.A., J.D.
Cantwell F. Muckenfuss III, B.A., J.D.
SaralaV. Nagala, BA., J.D.
Charles M. Nathan, B.A., J.D.
Ann M. Parrent, BA., J.D.
Avi Perry, B.A., J.D.
Andrew J. Pincus, B.A., J.D.
Eric S. Robinson, A.B., M.BA., J.D.
David N. Rosen, A.B., LL.B.
Charles A. Rothfeld, A.B., J.D.
John M. Samuels, B.A., J.D., LL.M, George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Sia M. Sanneh, BA., MA., J.D.
Ellen Scalettar, B.A., J.D.
Kevin S. Schwartz, A.B., M.BA., Ph.D., J.D.
Erin R. Shaffer, B.A., J.D.
Phil Spector, BA., J.D.
Lisa Suatoni, B.A., M.E.S., Ph.D., Timothy B. Atkeson Visiting Clinical Environmental Lecturer in Law
Jake Sullivan, B.A., M.Phil., J.D., Martin R. Flug Visiting Lecturer in Law
Alexander T. Taubes, B.A., J.D.
Marc Trevino, A.B., J.D.
Thomas Ullmann, B.S., J.D.
Stefan Underhill, B.A., J.D.
John M. Walker, Jr., BA., J.D., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Michael M. Wiseman, A.B., J.D.
Allison M. Zieve, A.B., J.D.
David M. Zornow, A.B., J.D.
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